European Public Opinion on Turkey’s EU Accession by Mammadova, Gunel
Khazar University  
 
MASTER THESIS 
European Public Opinion on Turkey’s EU Accession 
 
Student: 
Gunel Mammadova 
Supervisor: 
Dr. Mukhtar Hajizada 
 
 
 
A thesis 
submitted in fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Science 
 
in the  
 
Department of Political Science and International Relations 
 
 
 
 
 
Baku 2016 
ABSTRACT 
“What do Europeans think of EU’s enlargement to Turkey and why?” is the main 
question that this research tries to deal with by making arguments, conducting 
analyses, providing proofs, and developing predictions.  
The study evaluates enlargement more than a technical procedure that takes public 
opinion into account as well.  According to the findings of the research, public 
support for Turkey’s accession to the EU is not only low, but also in decline. With 
some exceptions, the ‘new’ (EU-28) are generally more favorable towards Turkey’s 
accession while the ‘old’ (EU-15) oppose it.1 EU countries with a large Turkish 
population are generally against to welcome Turkey in EU.2 Countries defending 
‘The European Project’ of deep political integration and a federal state pose a 
negative attitude on Turkey’s accession than who backs economic union and mutual 
benefits. The study also finds the extreme-right and nationalist parties standing 
against Turkey’s membership contrary to Liberals, Greens and the European United 
Left who usually are not so negative regarding it. 
The study claims that Europeans’ attitudes towards Turkey’s accession to the 
European Union (EU) are largely shaped under the influence of perceived, 
misperceived, really existing or highly predicted factors in value-based, materialistic 
or moral character. In other words, European public opinion on Turkey’s membership 
to the EU is not only about the misperceptions, but also true perceptions or rational 
predictions and calculations. In addition to the fulfillment of official membership 
requirements, Turkey-, EU-, country- and individual-specific factors also effect 
Europeans opinion on Turky’s accession to the EU. For most Europeans, political and 
social concerns are not only remarkable but also rather persistent. So as conomic 
disadvantages turns into advantages or vice versa as time goes on. However, this 
hypothsis hardly fits social and sometimes political matters.  
                                                          
1 Hatipoğlu, E., Müftüler-Baç, M. & Karakoç, E.  (2014) ‘Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey’s EU 
Accession, Turco-Scepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis.’ MAXCAP Working Paper Series, No. 4, pp. 1-26.  
2 Dagdeverenis, D. (2014) ‘EU Public Opinion and Turkey’s EU Membership.’ EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working 
Paper, No. 2, pp. 1-22.  
 
The study also answers if European citizens or elites form opposition toward 
Turkey’s EU membership. It describes public opinion in any EU member state over 
Turkey’s accession to the EU as influenced by the electoral market where the 
electorate and party elites are in a ‘give-take’ relationship, a never-ended periodical 
process. According to the study, in some European countries, national governments 
and ideologies, the (‘top’), insistently create decline in citizens (’down’) support to 
Turkey’s accession whereas in other European countries political elites act according 
to the citizens will and tend to be more attractive for the voters or party members.  
Nevertheless, it concludes that Turkey’s EU membership is an elitist task that can be 
realized if the geopolitical environment requires and elites present it more desirable 
to the citizens. Due to the current internal, regional and international instability 
concerns of EU and Turkey, the accession sounds urgent, advantageous for them, but 
also rather costly in the evaluations of the study. 
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I INTRODUCTION  
Turkey’s EU membership perspective as well as the European public opinion on it 
constitutes one of the most popular and controversial topics of both Turkish and 
European academic researches and non-academic disputes regarding Turkey-EU 
relations. Despite Turkish membership efforts since 1950s, it remains the longest 
application process of all times. The dilemma between the duration of the pre-
accession negotiations and EU-standard reforms in Turkey from 2005 on and the 
trend of declining support for Turkish membership in Europe makes the case to fall 
under extended number of discussions.  
Turkey, who tried to keep her neutrality during WWII and had the wish of 
civilization and modernization viewed Europe as a more civilized and modernized 
one. As the war was over, she took part in the Marshall Plan, became a member of 
the Council of Europe, NATO, OSCE, and applied for membership in the EU.   
The history of Turkey’s application for the EEC membership dates back to 1959 
when Turkey applied for  
associate membership and lasts until today. With the aim of integrating Turkey into a 
customs union with the EEC, the Ankara Agreement/the Association Agreement, 
"Agreement Creating An Association between the Republic of Turkey and the 
European Economic Community“ was signed on 12 Septembr 1963. Despite of a 
huge amount of controversies and rejections, finally, on 12 December 1999, Helsinki 
European Council officially recognized Turkey as an equal candidate for full 
membership. After reforms in Turkey, on 3 October 2005, the EU-Turkish 
negotiations on acquis chapters were started. However there were some countries 
such as Austria and Germany that preferred the privileged partnership with Turkey to 
her full EU membership. 15 acquis chapters out of 35 are frozen by the EU Council, 
France and Cyprus, 15 chapters are open to discussion and only 1 chapter (Science & 
Research (June 2006)) is closed.3 
When it comes to the dynamic of the Europeans opinion on Turkey’s application, 
there is a controversial process. According to 2005-2013 Eurobarometer surveys held 
in the European countries, in spite of the accession negotiations started from 2005 
and reforms in Turkey, the support for Turkish membership is not only low, but also 
in decline.  
As the negotiation process between Turkey and EU is rich in ups and downs and the 
realization of Turkey’s EU membership loses its credibility, the study analyses and 
explains the European public opinion on Turkey’s accession bid in both theoretical 
and practical frameworks in the thesis.  
1.1 Methodology 
The research is conducted under the hypothesis that EU decisions on enlargement 
policy including Turkey’s accession consider European public opinion as well. The 
approvalal rate of Turkey’s EU membership differs both between and inside the 
member states. The variations in Europeans’ attitudes can be explained with the legal 
membership requirements and some unofficial factors.   
“What do Europeans think of EU’s enlargement to Turkey and why?” is the main 
question that this research tries to deal with by making arguments, conducting 
analyses, providing with proofs, and developing predictions. Some secondary 
questions as following are also developed: 
How and why public opinion is important in the EU? 
How do European citizens view Turkey’s accession to the EU? 
How do European elites view Turkey’s accession to the EU? 
What factors afeect European public opinion on Turkey’s EU membership? 
What says the related theoretical approaches?, etc. 
                                                          
3 ‘Turkey-EU Relations.’  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa 
After defining the research and secondary questions the methodology should be 
designed accordingly. It usually includes the methods of researching and data 
collecting. 
In the development of this thesis, to conduct profound study, both qualitative and 
quatative reseach methods are applied. The method of documentary analysis that 
means to acquire data from existing related documents is mainly reffered to for 
describing and explaining facts and ideas in this case. A large set of documents with 
applicable graphs and tables are referred to in order to conduct analysis and arrive at 
conclusions. 
Interviewing as a widely applied qualitative research method is also used to base on 
direct first hand information on the researh question. An untructured interview with 
open questions and a randomly-selected respondent enabled observation of how a 
European think and feel regarding the research subject. It gives the chance to test, to 
soome extent, the reliability of the acquired data in a real situation. The man from the 
Netherlands, a professor, desposed an educated, high-skilled, employed Dutch’s 
attitudes concerning the research question that the existing documents describe. In his 
approach, he does not differ from their elites at all.    
1.2 Data collection  
The research rests on some data collecting methods like self-repor, documentary 
analysis and interview.  
Using the method of self-report, the researcher referrs to her background in order to 
outline the general scheme of thoughts. It also assists to choose the research topic. 
Documumentary analiysis is the main method of data collecting of the current 
research. Freely-accessible documents by both Turkish and Non-Turkish authors, 
favouring and arguing Turkey’s membership to the EU are objects to the analysis due 
to avoid biased information and sound neutral.  Not to lose actuality and use out-of-
dated information, the referred literature largely involves recently issued documents. 
Analyses of different documents with various approaches regarding the research 
question contribute to brain-storming and hypothesis developing processes. It pays 
way to some arguments and contra-arguments and challenge of ideas.  
The method of collecting data via communication with the respondents, interviewing, 
is also referred to aiming at getting first hand information. The reliability of the data 
collecting via one or two respondends is not guaranteed. 
1.3 Theoretical background  
1.3.1. A. M. Ruiz-Jimenez and J. I. Torreblanca: the three hypotheses4 
A large amount of literature debationg on how Europeans patterns of bahaviour are 
shaped refers to three-fold analysis by A. M. Ruiz-Jimenez and J. I. Torreblanca that 
claims that, Europeans decision on this case highly depends on whether they give 
priority to cost-benefit calculations, common identity and moral values, or the 
fulfillment of accession criteria by the candidate country. A. M. Ruiz-Jimenez and J. 
I. Torreblanca conduct the analysis of Eurobarometer survey of 2006 which asks 
Europeans whether: 
 Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography (geography); 
 Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history (history); 
 Turkey’s accession to the EU would strengthen the regional security (security); 
 cultural difference between Turkey and the EU member states are significant 
not to allow Turkey in (cultural differences); 
 membership of Turkey with nearly 76 million population would contribute to 
the rejuvenation of an ageing Europe (rejuvenation); 
 there would be any large immigration from Turkey to the more developed EU 
countries (immigration); 
 Turkey would fully respect human rights after her accession to the EU (human 
rights); 
 Turkey’s accession would largely improve the state economy (economy). 
                                                          
4 Ruiz-Jimenez A. M. & Torreblanca J.I. (2007) ‘European Public Opinion and Turkey’s Accession Making Sense of 
Arguments for and against.’ European Policy Institutes Network, No. 16, pp. 1-48. 
In conclusion of a large-scale survey on European public attitude on Turkey’s 
membership in some EU countries, A. M. Ruiz-Jimenez and J. I. Torreblanca suggest 
three hypotheses to explain the attitude of EU people: 
Identity/value-based/’moral’ hypothesis  
According to this approach, public opinion rests on considerations whether Turkey is 
a part of Europe and gelongs European identity or not. Europeans give priority to 
preservation of common moral European values and identity as well as belonging to 
Europe or not when they decide on enlargement. “Identitarian”/“value-based” view 
perceives the EU as a geographically limited entity or a community with a strong 
sense of common identity, history, culture and traditions. For those who share this 
point of view,  both the decisions and political discourses on enlargement should be 
acceptable morally: the more a candidate is related to European geography, history,  
culture, or so on, the more likely its membership would be supported or otherwise. It 
means that people may consider some decisions legitimate that they do not directly 
benefit from but just because they are adopted by the community which they feel they 
belong to.5 
In Turkey’s case, Europeans take into account Turkey’s geography, religion, history, 
incompatibility between Islam and democracy, etc. when they make their opinion 
towards her membership. To phrase in a sentence, this approach argues that the more 
Europeans are conceived of the differences between Turkish and European cultures, 
the less they support Turkey’s EU accession. Europeans are more Turcophile or 
Turkosceptic if they are convinced of historical, geographycal and cultural 
commonalities or differences and contradictions respectively. Consequently, one can 
find a positive relation between the belief in comprehension of European and the 
Muslim values of Turkey after the accession comes into reality and support to 
Turkey’s membership to the EU. Both realistic, perceived (misperceived) and 
predicted concerns of Europeans are evaluated as the ‘hard factors’, persistent but 
influential, to shape European public attitude towards Turkey in the literature. 
                                                          
5 Canan-Sokullu, Ş. E. (2011) ‘Italian Public Opinion on Turkey’s EU Accession: Utilitarian Calculations, Identitarian 
Evaluations or Perceived Threats?’ PERCEPTIONS, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 47-70. 
Accordingly, the thesis guesses that econoomic disadvantages turn into advantages or 
vice versa as time goes on whereas political and social concerns, the ‘hard factors’ 
are not only remarkable but also rather persistent. In compliance with European 
perceptions, largely, culturally, religiously and geographically different Turkey does 
not have a place in the EU or Europe. Europeans perceive Turkey as a non-European 
country with a distinct culture, large Muslim populace and a unique geographic 
position. Both most Europeans Europeans and many Turks claim for a constant 
incompatibility between Turkish and European values as well as societies. An 
extensive proportion of Europeans believe in important differences regarding culture 
and respect for human rights between Turkey and the Union, but are not so sensitive 
to common geography and history.  
Utilitarian/instrumental hypothesis 
This approach argues that public opinion is formed as the result of cost-benefit 
calculations (political, economic and social considerations) by European public. 
Antonia M. Ruiz-Jimenez and Jose I. Torreblanca ensure evidence to their 
hypothesis:6 
Evidence 1: In 2006-2007, support for enlargement increased related to the recovery 
of European economy. 
Evidence 2: After the financial crisis of 2008-2009, the support is in decline.  
“Utilitarian”/“instrumental” arguments based on a cost-benefit analysis (a rational 
calculus of costs and benefits) sound pragmatic: the more the Europeans benefit or 
expect to benefit from EU policies in terms of economy, policy or security, the more 
they support it or otherwise. “Materialistic” model claim that if European citizens 
think that the costs will outweigh the benefits regarding political, security, 
institutional or economic matters at European, regional, national or personal level 
they will oppose EU policies as well as future enlargement. Perception of the 
costs/benefits is heterogeneous not only among citizens inside member states, but 
also among member states themselves. Europeans make macro-level and personal-
                                                          
6 Ruiz-Jimenez A. M. & Torreblanca J.I. (2007) ‘European Public Opinion and Turkey’s Accession Making Sense of 
Arguments for and against.’ European Policy Institutes Network, No. 16, pp. 1-48.  
level calculations to form their opinion on enlargement. Macro-level calculations take 
into account the costs or benefits of EU expansion on national economies, belief in 
the economic growth of the candidate country and the Union, and predictions about 
security issues after enlargement. Europeans also calculate personal-level threats and 
benefits. For example, they think of predicted rise of unemployment rate.  
Consequently, it seems that Europeans are relatively more Turcophile when the 
enlargement seems costless, when they would financially less suffer without any 
reduction in financial aid, or when the enlargement is considered beneficial for the 
candidate country. The more Europeans believe in material benefits that Turkey’s 
membership will bring, the higher they are supportive of this enlargement. Otherwise, 
it feeds Turcosceptic attitudes.7 From utilitarian point of view regarding Turkey’s EU 
membership, economic and security benefits such as extension of the EU market, 
rejuvenation of aging European labor market, contribution to EU neighborhood 
policy, more peace in near-abroad and the EU’s image as a global and multicultural 
power are often articulated. For utilitarians, an economically highly developed and a 
more democratic Turkey is less dangerous for Europpeans advantages.  
Post-civic /post-national/rights-based hypothesis  
Post-civic/rights-based/‘ethical’ hypothesis claims that public opinion takes into 
consideration whether Turkey can fulfill the accession criteria. For the third, “rights-
based”/”post-national” vision, the EU is a ‘post-national’ or ‘civic’ Union. European 
integration and enlargement should rest on a set of universal principles and values, 
such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Accordingly, those who hold 
such beliefs, regardless of a high degree of cultural differences and traditions, support 
enlargement processes if they believe that the applicants respect this set of values and 
principles. In other words, they consider that a full democratic and prosperous 
country in terms of ‘Copenhagen criteria’ of 1993 has a place in EU. 
In conclusion of their analysis of Eurobarometer surveys of 2006, Antonia M. Ruiz-
Jimenez and Jose I.Torreblanca define ‘moral’ approach more relevant for opposition 
                                                          
7 Canan-Sokullu, Ş. E. (2011) ‘Italian Public Opinion on Turkey’s EU Accession: Utilitarian Calculations, Identitarian 
Evaluations or Perceived Threats?’ PERCEPTIONS, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 47-70.  
to Turkey’s EU accession. ‘Instrumental’ approach is less relevant to explain 
European public opinion towards Turkey’s accession to the EU. Turkey’s EU 
membership comes true in case the rights-based approach prevails. Therefore, a wide 
European-level debate on Turkey including post-national arguments to justify 
Turkey’s membership is hugely needed. Antonia M. Ruiz-Jimenez and Jose 
I.Torreblanca points to the fact that the identitarian approach generally fits public 
opinion in old member states whereas cost-benefit calculus and post-civic dimension 
relevant for new member states.  
Although lots of these arguments reflect the common wisdom about European public 
opinion on Turkey’s membership, it is possible to develop some contra-arguments. 
The interviews conducted with some Europeans during the activity on the eve of the 
first European Games in 2015 in Baku show to some extent that: 
 Cost-benefit calculus and identity mainly shape Europeans attitudes towards 
Turkey’s membership to the EU; 
 Turkey is perceived geographycally, culturally and historically different from 
Europe; 
 In cost-benefit calculus, accession of Turkey would be rather costly and the 
management of any economic and financial crisis would be complicated 
further; 
 According to Europeans, Turkey’s accession would not cause rejuvenation in 
Europe. Because on the one hand claims about the aging Europe is abstract, on 
the other hand young  Turks would bring their families together themselves; 
 Most of Turks in Europe are characterised as uneducated people who work at 
places where they use their hands instead of their brains (technologies); 
 Post-civic hypothesis sounds more unrealistic (According to Eurobarometer 
surveys of 2005-2013, Turkey is the least preferred country. “Does a fullly 
democratic and prosperous Turkey have a place in EU?” (2008: 22% say 
‘no’).8 
                                                          
8 Dagdeverenis, D. (2014) ‘EU Public Opinion and Turkey’s EU Membership.’ EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working 
Paper, No. 2, pp. 1-22.  
1.3.2. The Social Identity Theory (1972) by Henri Tajfel and JohnTurner9 
The Social Identity Theory (1982) by H. Tajfel and J. Turner is also applied on 
explanation of opposition to Turkey’s EU membership. H. Tajfel and J. Turner 
develop the theory in order to find out psychological foundation of intergroup 
discrimination. 
H. Tajfel (1979) suggests that the groups that we belong to like family, social class 
and team are significant source of pride and self-esteem and we perceive our sense of 
social identity from these groups.  
Tajfel and Turner push forward three mental stages in formulation of in- and out-
groups, in other words, social identity: 
Social Categorization Social Identification Social Comparison 
- The first mental and cognitive process is to categorize objects (peoples) to 
understand and identify them. It is the process of social categorization. By using a 
range of social categories such as colour, nationality, religious affiliation and 
profession, we categorize people as well as ourselves. Categorization into groups 
allows us to understand the social environment that we belong to and behave 
accordingly. We behave under the norms of groups that we belong to. We can 
belong to many different groups (I am a sister/daughter, a student, a citizen, 
Azerbaijani, Muslim, white, etc.-the researcher).  
- Social identification is the second mental stage. After putting ourselves in a group 
in the process of social categorization, we admit the identity of that group. If you 
categorize yourself as a student you adapt to the student’s identity and behave as 
a student does.  Our self-esteem will be defined in accordance with the 
membership to the group. 
- The third stage of formulation of social grouping is social comparison. Given we 
have made social categorization and put ourselves in a group and adopted the 
identity of the group that we belong to, then we will begin to compare the group 
                                                          
9 McLeod, S. (2008) ‘Social Identity Theory.’ http://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html 
that we belong to with other groups. We will positively regard our group in order 
to provide our self-esteem. It also explains how prejudice against other groups 
appears. Social comparison creates rival groups. We will compete to enhance the 
self-esteem of the group that we put ourselves into. We begin to believe that our 
group is different from the others and ‘we’ are distinct (group distinctiveness). 
We start to compete for the resources and claim to have most part of them. We 
increase our personal image, self-image, by increasing the status of the group that 
we belong to or discriminating against ‘out’ groups. Discrimination by in-group 
against out-group in order to increase its self-image will happen. To enhance its 
self-image, in-group will also seek for negative characteristics of out-group. 
Prejudice against out cultures sometime results in racism or even genocide 
(Prejudice against Jews in Germany brought to genocide of them). 
According to the authors who apply this theory on Turkish membership bid, suggest 
that:  
Europeans in the EU has defined them and ‘us’ and the others as ‘them’ or ‘other’. 
They adopted European identiry based on Christianity and democratic values. They 
comapare themselves with the ‘other’ like Turks and claim that there exist apparent 
differences in European and Muslim/Turkish culture and values that do not allow 
Turks access EU. Europeans claim that Muslim Turkey is differen from the Christian 
Europe; Democracy and Islam are incompatible; Turks are the ‘other’ for Europe. 
Europeans appreciate their group as distinct from the other. Group members perceive 
the ‘other’/’out-group’ in Europe as a threat to their Europpean identity. They argue 
that the group which they belong to should get most of the resources as well as 
materialistic resources as the dominant group in this society. In order to enhance its 
self-image, Europeans in the EU also seek for negative characteristics of Turks. 
Turks are undemocratic, radical, extremist and poor, in a word, ‘problematic’, in 
Europeans’ comparisons. 
1.3.3. The Contact Hypothesis 
This study makes a reference to the Contact Hypothesis (Intergroup Contact Theory) 
by Gordon W. Allport (1954) in order to explain the mostly appareant direct 
relationship between the presence of Turkish immigrants and the level of support to 
Turkey’s membership in a host country.10 
In his hypothesis G. W. Allport claims that direct intergroup contact under a 
favorable condition contributes to the reduction of prejudice between two groups. 
Thanks to interpersonal communication between groups and mutual exchange of 
views, groups’ members may understand each other. In this way, stereotypes and 
discrimination decrease.  
G. W. Allport argues that equal status of groups, intergroup cooperation for common 
goals, respect for laws and customs, and informal personal relations make the contact 
effective. 
However, sometimes, group members use the opportunity to communicate to 
discriminate and fight against the other group. G. W. Allport finds out that an 
unfavorable condition, including irrelevant usage of contact and in some cases a short 
term of communication, lead to a negative contact between groups. Negative contact 
under unfavorable conditions, may extend prejudice and tension, and inner- or out-
group categorization. It will lead to material, political or cultural inter-group conflicts. 
Direct intergroup contact between the citizens and Turkish immigrants, inter-group 
cooperation between the gropus with equal status conducted on shared common goals, 
in a host EU country is more likely to lessen prejudice and favor support for the 
Turkey’s membership. Negative contact between the citizens and Turkish immigrants, 
a host EU country may extend prejudice and tension, and inner- and out-group 
categorization. It will lead to conflicts in material, political or cultural contexts. 
                                                          
10 Everett, J. A. C. (2013) ‘Intergroup Contact Theory: Past, Present and Future.’ The Inquisitive Mind, Issue 2.  
http://www.in-mind.org/article/intergroup-contact-theory-past-present-and-future 
1.4 Scope and Limitations of the thesis 
Thid thesis provides the historical background of Turkey’s application for EU 
membership, the dynamics of European public opinion on it. It also makes 
predictions and suggestions. The scope of research includes the period from Turkey’s 
application for EU membership until now. It analyses public opinion on Turkey’s 
accession to the EU in 28 member states. Due to avoid obsolete and invalid data and 
unilateral approach, the study mostly refers to the literature (books, journal articles, 
news, etc.) developed by Turkish and non-Turkish, including European, researchers 
in the 2000s. Rising hopelessness about Turkey’s EU membership raises claims in 
academic circles that it is not worthy to analyze the case further. Taking into account 
that in spite of the official negotiations since 2005 there is little success and more 
confusion in Turkish case, the study aims at making contributions to related 
discussion. Originating from a profound study, the thesis reflects the arguments both 
for and against Turkey’s accession to the EU, the approaches of European and non-
European researchers and providing with historical background from 1950s and aims 
aims at enriching the existing concerning literature. 
Nevertheless, the thesis suffers from the reliability of the secondary data acquired 
fom existing documents. To what extent interviews with one or to repondents provide 
reliable information is another limitation of the study. 
1.5 Literature review 
The existing related literature discussing the European public opinion on Turkey’s 
EU mmembership and the factors in effect can be divided into subjective and neutral 
ones. They are aginst or for Turkey’s accession to the EU by taking materialistic, 
identitarian or post-civic dimensions into account. 00000 
The article ‘Accession of Turkey to the European Union—A Question of 
Advantage?’ by Lutz Paul Sommer argues that the perceived advantages or 
disadvantages (primarily, wealth-oriented in nature) of a candidate’s accession as 
well as of the member state’s own membership effect European citizens’ opinion 
about any enlargement. In his study L.P.Sommer claims that as economic/utilitarian 
calculations have a lot to do with European citizens’ decision on enlargement, highly 
developed countries are perceived less dangerous for their own advantages: they pay 
more to the EU and need less. The article categorizes “Economic Group” of member 
countries whose position regarding EU enlargement or the advantages of EU 
membership is shaped due to the economic reasons and the “Residual Group” for 
whom economic advantages are supposed insufficient to decide on enlargement. 
They take political, social, and other concerns into account as well. It also 
distinguishes “new” and “old” member states regarding enlargement issue and argues 
that new member states of Eastern Europe view enlargement of the EU as a tool for 
becoming a global trade partner and support expansion. However the member states 
who oppose enlargement do not accept this vision. The study outlines eight key 
criteria for Turkey’s EU membership (Turkey’s economic situation, predicted 
immigration from Turkey to EU member states, rejuvenation of EU’s aging 
population, safety matters, respect for human rights, cultural differences, historical 
affiliation, and geographical position) set by  the EU (Copenhagen, 1993) and 
questioned in public opinion surveys. 
Another related literature by Adam Szymañski, “EU Pre-accession Process of Turkey 
– Determinants and Prospects” is developed under the hypothesis that the factors in 
Turkey are of great essence for bilateral relations with the EU, but the factors in the 
Union and its member states are decisive in the pre-accession process. In other words, 
the political and economic dimensions within the EU, dynamic of European public 
opinion and the interests of locomotives of the EU lead to interruption or continuation 
in the process. By making some references to the interviews made from 2011 to 2013 
with the EU representatives in Ankara and Brussels, the study defines factors at three 
levels: 
- both economic and political situation of the EU that shapes Europeans position 
towards enlargement, in general and Turkey, in particular, and the changes within 
the institutions of the EU such as the EU Council, European Commission (EU-
level); 
- the geographical size and geopolitical location, amount of population, cultural 
difference, the role of religion, economic condition, the consensus among the 
major political forces and public opinion related to the EU membership, 
nationalist and conservative rise and sensitiveness about the national sovereignty, 
Turkish army’s great influence on the political system, the lasting differences 
between the national legislation and the EU law and Turkey’s foreign policy 
(candidate-level); 
- member states-level factors; 
A. Szymañski links the pace of the pre-accession process to political configurations 
(The new political configuration has made the negotiations to be opened on the 23th 
and 24th acquis chapters.) and the elections or appointments to the positions within the 
EU institutions (the EU Council). 
Serdar Ş. Güner, in his study ‘Alternative Futures for the European Union-Turkey 
Accession Negotiations’ finds Turkey’s accession process as a unique case and notes 
that meeting membership criteria does not mean the end of the process for Turkey. 
When it comes to Turkey’s membership, the cultural and religious differences, the 
large population, improvement of democracy and minority rights in Turkey, the 
changes in her new foreign policy, the Cyprus issue, the emergence of the alternative 
‘privileged partnership’ and the open-ended character of the accession process have 
much to do with the failure of negotiations. Despite these facts the negotiations are on 
track. The negotiations and relations between Turkey and the EU member states can 
be explained with the mutual interactions. It is one of the papers that point to the shift 
in its foreign policy while the shift is yet underway: the new Turkish policy that is 
often coined as “soft Euroasianism’ and ‘zero-conflict with neighbours’, and the 
recent transitions in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation from the Western one to an 
independent and unstable one. Unlike other existing studies, it indicates Turkey’s 
new foreign policy goals of being a power as not its departure from the EU bid, but 
being more attractive and beneficial for the EU. In other words, S. Ş. Güner assumes 
that a more powerful Turkey would successfully work out its problems without any 
EU engagement. According to S. Ş. Güner, the new Turkish foreign policy can fail or 
succeed. Its failure would strengthen the objections and undermine the supporters 
while its success would be indifferent for objectors, but worthy for supporters.  In 
sum, he argues that a more economically, democratically and politically powerful 
Turkey would not surely be an EU member, but it can cooperate with them. S. Ş. 
Güner claims that the supporters cooperate and negotiate not because they help its 
accession but because they do not want to seem as opposing ones and they want to 
benefit from the mutual relations. Evaluations about the present and future payoffs or 
costs by each supporter can differ. Despite this fact, if the general evaluations of the 
current and future values of the cooperation are higher than the value of defection or 
Turkey’s unilateral exit they cooperate.  Accordingly, if the latter outweighs the 
former they will defect. In other words, they cooperate if the future less concerns 
them. Actually, both the objectors and supporters seek for a Turkish decision to give 
up the accession process. As Turkey loses all its beliefs in support in addition to the 
payoffs to the cooperation it gives up the accession process. 
The article “Why Turkey should join the European Union: Arguments in favour of 
Turkish Membership” by V. Modebadze and F. M. Sayın place integration to 
European Union among Turkey’s major foreign policy goals and claim that the rise of 
right-wing political parties as well as the influence of Christian democratic and 
conservative parties in European countries (especially, France, Austria and Germany) 
increases opposition to enlargement with any candidate. That’s why democratic 
reforms in hopeless Turkey are still uncompleted. To disapprove the concerns that 
Turkey is too poor in economy and her accession to the EU will be rather costly, the 
authors argue that Turkish economy is on rise while lots of European countries suffer 
from financial crisis and, in fact, Turkey’s accession would widen the European 
market and raise its competitiveness. Turkey’s geopolitical location is described as a 
bridge between Asia and Europe that would broaden economic, trade as well as 
cultural ties of Europe with the Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus and even China, 
contribute to diversification of  energy roots further and greatly reduce dependence 
on insecure energy supply by Russia contribute to EU’s energy security.  In terms of 
Turks migration to EU states, it claims that regarding Turkey’s case, not only Europe 
would be invaded by Turkish citizens, but also many of Turks in European countries 
would return back. She would also attract lots of Arabic migrants in Europe. Thus, 
immigration of young and energetic workforce would reduce the labor shortage in 
European countries, rejuvenate Europe and help to demographic crisis and social 
contract between the generations there. Germany has already used Turkish 
immigrants to settle its labor shortage. All these contribute to the argument that 
immigration from Turkey would be advantageous in terms of economic growth and 
demographic conditions. Another advantage of large young and energetic Turkish 
population is to strengthen military security in Europe. Lack of information, 
misperception and negative stereotypes draw the profile of culturally and religiously 
too different Turkey in Europe. Nevertheless, Turkey is a democratic, secular, 
tolerant and pro-western country where rule of law is in force and the government 
respects the rights and freedoms. The acceleration of accession process would 
complete the democratic reforms in Turkey on the one hand. On the other hand, it 
will make Europeans more tolerant towards different religious communities as well 
as Muslims and the contradictions between Europeans and Muslims would be 
reduced. Full transformation in Turkey due to the EU membership could lead to the 
democratization, freedom and development of all Muslim countries. Otherwise, EU 
can lose Turkey in favour of non-democratic, totalitarian countries. The EU can 
absorb Turkey and Europeans uninformed of Turkey’s EU membership can benefit 
from her accession. 
Three types of problems of Turkey’s membership including problems within the 
member states regarding harmonization between two civilizations, problems within 
the Union after the accession of Turkey with a large territory and high amount of 
population, last but not least, the external effects of it are perceived by H.Arnold who 
is generally against this enlargement. H.Arnold largely claims for geographical limits, 
European and Turkish uncertainties (serious internal socio-cultural and political 
uncertainties on the one hand and confusion between Turkish elites on defining 
Turkey’s future role as an actor of international arena on the other hand) and the 
negative effects of membership of Turkey. In his article ‘Political Arguments against 
Turkey’s Accession to the European Union’, he argues against Turkey’s membership 
whom he does not consider a part of Europe. Arguments for the role of the military 
power in Turkey supporting secularism, interrupted Europeanization policy in the 
country and   the flow of Turkish immigrants to EU member states are also backed by 
the author. Pointing to US pressure on EU and member states concerning Turkey’s 
accession to the EU, H. Arnold acknowledges ‘buy time’ policy of the EU. On 
contrary to the studies that interpret Turkey’s role as a bridge between Asia and 
Europe, he characterizes Turkey like a self-interested mediator with great ambitions. 
Given Turkey was accepted in, the border of the EU would extend to Georgia, the 
South Caucasus, Iran, Iraq, Syria and be a part of the Middle East. Turkey having 
more voices in decision-making and conducting active pro-Arab policies in the 
Middle East would influence on the EU’s foreign policy activities. Turkey is a 
country with a long history moving sometimes in European and sometimes in other 
direction. All in all, these mean a serious threat to the security. With respect to 
acceptance of Turkey’s application, the author also blames European uncertainties 
such as inability of the member states to develop a common position on Turkey’s 
membership application as well as the principle of subsidiarity, the effects of 
globalization and various approaches towards cooperation and integration by EU 
member states. H.Arnold predicts that if Turkey was accessed to the EU once, to 
prevent membership applications from the outside of European borders would be 
impossible. More likely, US-backed Israel’s application for membership that also 
means to push the EU into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems rather predictable. 
The number of members of an organization is in contrast with its influence. When the 
number increases the organization becomes more fragile. All in all, Arnold expresses 
all plausible fears of Europeans.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis  
The thesis is organized into introduction, three main sections and conclusion. After 
including the methodology, data collection methods, theoretical background and 
literature review in introduction Turkey’s application and Turkish-EU negotiations, 
Europeans’ opinion on Turkey’s EU membership and the factors effecting European 
public opinion on Turkey’s accession to the EU are discussed accordingly in the 
following sections. 
In the relevant subsections of the first section outlines Turkey’s EU accession path 
from 1950s to 2005 when the negotiations with Turkey on acquis chapters were 
started, official/legal requirements for accession by the EU, and the nefotiations 
between the EU and Turkey on acquis chapters. The study finds out that the open-
ended character of the negotiating process, both legal and additional criteria for 
accession of Turkey make the application process as the longest and most 
complicated one.  
The discussion is extended into the dynamics of Europeans’ opinion on Turkey’s full 
EU membership in the second section. In its three subsequent subsections, the thesis 
presents the findings about how and why the public opinion is important in the EU, 
how do European citizens view Turkey’s accession to the EU and how do European 
elites view Turkey’s accession to the EU and adds related generalizations. Building 
on the 2005-2015 Eurobarometer surveys held in the European countries, accession 
process includes some political considerations like European public opinion and an 
increasing opposition towards Turkey’s accession to the EU interrupts pre-accession 
negotiations and bilateral relations. The section finds a spilover between the attitudes 
of European citizens and elites who are in a ‘give-take’ relationship, a never-ended 
periodical process. 
Resting on the analysis of all primary and secondary data, the four subsections of 
third section make grouping of the factors effecting European public opinion on 
Turkey’s accession to the EU . The sections arrives at the conclusion that Europeans 
opinion on Turkey’s EU accession is shaped under the influence of Turkey-, EU-, 
country- and individual-specific factors.  
All the findings of the study regarding the research questions and its suggestion for 
increasing public support  the final section  are presented in the final section of the 
thesis. 
  
II TURKEY’S APPLICATION AND TURKISH-EU NEGOTIATIONS 
2.1. Turkey’s EU accession path: timeline. 
The history of Turkey’s application for the EEC membership dates back to 1959 
when Turkey applied for associate membership (the one who is a member of a club, 
but has only partial rights and privileges or subordinate status) in the European 
Economic Community.11 
 On 12 September 1963, The Ankara Agreement/the Association Agreement, 
"Agreement Creating an Association between The Republic of Turkey and the 
European Economic Community“ was signed and came into effect in December 
1964. It was devised to integrate Turkey into a customs union with the EEC. The 
agreement pushed forward three stages of integration of Turkey to the EU: 
preparatory, transitional and final stages. According to the agreement, the transitional 
stage ends with the completion of the customs union.  
In November 1970, “Additional Protocol” considering a timetable for the abolition of 
tariffs and quotas on goods traded between Turkey and the Community was signed. 
The Protocol provided the provisions and obligations for the transitional stage.12 
In April 1987, Turkey applied for formal membership in the European Community. 
In March 1995, Customs Union between European Union and Turkey Customs 
Union was agreed on and entered into force on 1 January 1996. As the Ankara 
Agreement planned, the Customs Union led to a high degree of integration between 
Turkey and EU. 13 
The Luxembourg EU Council of 1997, because of poor relations with Greece, Cyprus 
conflict, economic and political situation in Turkey, started accession talks with the 
CEECs with the exclusion of Turkey. 14 
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Despite of a huge amount of controversies and rejections, finally, on 12 December 
1999, Helsinki European Council officially granted the status of equal candidate 
country for full membership to Turkey.  
In March 2001, the European Council passed the first Accession Partnership. 15 
After the Commission’s Recommendation on Turkey's Progress towards accession in 
October 2004, the conditions for the opening of accession negotiations were defined 
by the Council in December 2004. 16 
In June 2005, the Commission adopted a Communication on the civil society 
dialogue between EU and candidate countries.  
As the European Council confirmed the fulfillment of the Copenhagen political 
criteria by Turkey in December 2004, negotiations on acquis chapters were started on 
3 October 2005. 
From time to time, the Council adopts revised Accession Partnerships for Turkey 
(2001, 2005, 2007, 2008).17 
2.2. Official and legal requirements for accession by the EU 
There are some official/legal requirements for accession by the EU according to the 
Treaty of Rome, Maastricht Treaty and the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ of 1993.  
According to the Treaty of Rome, ‘… any European state may apply to become a 
member of the Community’.18  
Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU is open to all 
European states that adhere to the principles of Article 6(1) of the TEU, freedom, 
democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.19  
There is another requirement in the Maasrtricht Treaty (TEU), ‘…member states shall 
have systems of government founded on the principle of democracy’. 20  In other 
section, it states that any European country that demonstrates respect and 
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commitment for the promotion of the democratic values the European Union builds 
on may apply for membership.21 
Any country that wants to be accessed to the EU must comply with ‘Copenhagen 
Criteria’ of 1993, which consist of three parts: 22 
  having stable democratic institutions ensuring democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, respect for and protection of minority rights (political criteria); 
 possessing a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union (economic 
criteria); 
 ability to take on and implement the obligations of a Member State rising from 
the law and policies, the acquis, of the EU, including adherence to the aims of 
economic, political and monetary union. 
After the enlargement round of 2004 with the accession of ten CEECs the absorption 
(integration) capacity of the EU became another key element of any enlargement in 
2006.23 According to the definition of absorption capacity of the EU by the European 
Commission, the EU institutions and candidates must be fully prepared for 
membership. It calls for the necessity of the public support to the enlargement both in 
the member states and the candidate states. 
The Negotiation Framework between the EU and Turkey set out on October 3 2005 
defines three other requirements for Turkey’s membership:24 
First additional criterion for Turkey’s membership requires Turkey to take 
unequivocal commitment to good relations with her neighbours and resolution of any 
well-known border disputes in accordance with the principle of peaceful settlement 
that the United Nations Charter defines. It also includes the possibility of jurisdiction 
by the International Court of Justice.  
Second additional criterion calls for the necessity of uninterrupted support by Turkey 
to efforts for effective settlment of the Cyprus issue within the United Nations 
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framework and the founding principles. It appreciates success in normalisation of 
bilateral relations of Turkey with all EU member states. As the Greek Cyprus is an 
EU member, Turkey is required to conduct normal bilateral relations with it.  
Third additional criterion demands Turkey the implementation of the obligations that 
she took by signing the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol. Turkey 
still rejects the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and refuses opening its sea and 
air ports to Cypriot vessels on the contrary to the agreement on customs union. 
2.3. Negotiation process on acquis chapters 
Turkey may become a member of the EU when negotiations between Turkey and the 
European Commission on acquis communautaire chapters are successfully completed 
and there is a unanimous agreement of the EU member states. As the European 
Commission describes, accession negotiations with a candidate country are designed 
for full and effective adoption of the EU acquis, the total body of the EU law, to its 
own legal system. The EU acquis is about the EU founding treaties, the amendments 
to these treaties, and the legislation by the EU bodies (EU Council, EU Commission, 
European Community and EU Court of Justice). Negotiations should be held on 33 
chapters out of 35 chapters of the acquis, 2 chapters do not require any negotiation. 
Regarding Turkey’s accession process, screening on acquis chapters started in 
October 2005 and was completed in September 2006. This process checks how the 
candidate country is ready to the EU membership.25 
15 chapters are opened (“Free Movement of Capital”; “Company Law”; “Intellectual 
Property Law”; “Information Society & Media”; “Food Safety, Veterinary & 
Phytosanitary Policy” (2010); “Taxation”; “Statistics”; “Enterprise & Industrial 
Policy”; “Trans-European Networks”; “Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural 
Instruments”; “Science & Research”; “Environment and Climate Change”; 
“Consumer & Health Protection”; “Financial Control”, "Economic & Monetary 
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Policy” (14 December 2015)) to discussion and only 1 chapter (“Science & 
Research” (June 2006)) is closed.26 
Negotiations with Turkey on 17 chapters out of 35 had been frozen by the EU 
Council, France and Cyprus (“Free Movement of Goods”; “Freedom of Movement 
for Workers”; “Right of Establishment for Companies & Freedom To Provide 
Services”; “Financial Services”; “Agriculture & Rural Development”; “Fisheries”; 
“Transport Policy”; “Energy”; “Economic & Monetary Policy”; “Regional Policy & 
Coordination of Structural Instruments” (June 2007) (was opened on 5 November 
2013); “Judiciary & Fundamental Rights”; “Justice, Freedom & Security”; 
“Education & Culture”; “Customs Union”; “External Relations”; “Foreign, Security 
& Defence Policy”;” Financial & Budgetary Provisions”; “Institutions”). 27 
Negotiations on two chapters (“Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural 
Instruments” (2013); "Economic & Monetary Policy" (2015)) are unfrozen.28 
Turkey has refused to recognize the Republic of Cyprus and rejected to open its ports 
and airports to traffic by ships and planes from Cyprus. Turkey rejection to apply the 
Additional Protocol to Cyprus resulted in the EU Council’s decision to freeze 
negotiations on 8 chapters in December 2006 (“Free Movement of Goods”; “Right of 
Establishment for Companies & Freedom To Provide Services”; “Financial 
Services”; “Agriculture & Rural Development”; “Fisheries”; “Transport Policy”; 
“Customs Union”; “External Relations”).29 
In 2007, France decided unilaterally to prevent opening of negotiations on 5 chapters 
(“Agriculture & Rural Development” ; “Economic & Monetary Policy” ; “Regional 
Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments”; “Financial & Budgetary 
Provisions”; “Institutions”) that were considered directly related with membership by 
France.30 
In 2009, Greek Cyprus stated its unilateral blockage on opening of 6 chapters 
(“Freedom of Movement for Workers”; “Energy”; “Judiciary & Fundamental 
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Rights”; “Justice, Freedom & Security”; “Education & Culture”; “Foreign, Security 
& Defence Policy”).31 
Launch of the "Positive Agenda" with Turkey by the EU in 201 
2 was estimated to give pace to negotiating process. However, it failed due to Gezi 
Park demonstrations handling in June 2013 that raised concernes about respect for 
human rights and freedoms in Turkey and fed Turkoscepticism in Europe.32   
Despite of ups and downs in the pre-accession process, on the negotiations on acquis 
on the 22nd chapter of the acquis (Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural 
Instruments) was opened on November 5, 2013 at Brussels after France removed its 
blockage (17 February 2013).33 
After France lifted its blockage, negotiations on "Economic & Monetary Policy" were 
unfrozen and opened on 14 December 2015. According to the chapter, Turkey will be 
brought in linne with the economic and monetary policy of the EU and the 
independence of the Central Bank will be guaranteed.34 
However, there are three chapters (‘Agriculture’, ‘Financial and Budgetary 
Provisions’, ‘Institutions’) that are blocked by France until Turkey will implement 
the Additional Protocol of Ankara Agreement and open her borders to ‘the Republic 
of Cyprus’.  
The EU and Turkey signed a readmission agreement expressing visa free travel of 
Turkish citizens to the EU countries in 2013. They have started liberalisation 
dialogue on removal of visas for the citizens of Turkey since that time. 
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III EUROPEANS’OPINION ON TURKEY’S EU MEMBERSHIP 
3.1. How and why the public opinion is important in the EU? 
Accession process is not just a simple technical, but also a political one including 
some political considerations (human rights; highly predictable immigration to more 
developed countries in the EU; the regional security; Kurdish and Cyprus issues; 
French and Dutch “nays” on the European Constitution referendums and etc.). 
European public opinion is one out of these political concerns that has an indirect role 
in EU policy choices and decisions taken by the EU.  
Building on the EU acquis, “EU has the right to decide when accession of new 
members will take place and admittance of new members is done with the unanimous 
consent of the member-states”35. It defines an unavoidable additional condition, the 
ability of the EU to integrate new members, “EU’s absorption capacity”. Related 
studies, find this notion more significant after the accession of countries with lots of 
problems and rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in referendums. European elites 
should take into account the negative experience with Bulgaria and Romania which 
became EU members despite the fact that the conditions required under the 
Copenheagen criteria of 1993 were poorly ensured by them and the European public 
stood against their accession.  
Conventional wisdom argues about the direct cause-effect link between the historic 
decision by the European Council on 17 December 2004 to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey and the French and Dutch ‘nays’ on the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty in May/June in 2005. The French and Dutch publics’ “nays” on 
the 2006 Constitutional Treaty are often interpreted as the public’s reaction to “an 
increasingly elitist EU project”36.   
The concerned literature argues that the fifth round of enlargement with less 
developed European states and French and Dutch ‘nays’ on the EU Constitution put 
an end to elitist government and gave significance to public opinion in decision-
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making. In this context, the ability of the EU to integrate new members, in popular 
words, “EU’s absorption capacity”, and fear of political cost make public opinion to 
be taken into consideration by political elites.  
It is also hard to avoid the fact that the governments taking responsibilities before 
their electorate should to act in accordance with the public wish in order not to lose 
its legitimacy. 
In addition to these, French and Austrian intentions and announcements about 
compulsory ratification of enlargement either through national parliaments or 
referendums (e.g. France has said that will hold a referendum on Turkey’s EU 
membership) are described as another tool to exaggerate the importance of public 
opinion as well as their perceptions and sentiments in postelitist decision-making. As 
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, stated, it is now 
Turkey’s responsibility to “win the hearts and minds of those European citizens who 
are open to, but not convinced of Turkey’s European destiny”.37 
In the related literature it is called as the shift from “permissive consensus” to 
“constraining disensus” since the Maastricht Treaty which means that decisions are 
not taken only by technocratic elites and EU citizens’ opinion seems to gain much 
more importance. It is referred to as an indicator of the rise of populist movement in 
Europe38. 
The rise of right-wing (the extreme rights) that is mostly against globalization, 
multiculturalism, much or less, ultranationalist, authoritarian, radical, populist and 
xenophobic in EU institutions and member states decreases public support to 
Turkey’s membership. 
The ability of the EU to integrate new members, “EU’s absorption capacity” is a 
rather popular notion articulated by EU elites when Turkey’s membership is on the 
agenda. It is mostly assumed to be developed to prevent Turkey’s membership.  
The researchers argue that while the Accession Treaty with Turkey will require 
ratification through parliament or the national referendums public support for 
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Turkey’s accession which is now in decrease will say the final word in this case. 
They are hopeless of a referendum supportingTurkey’s membership to the EU in 
Turkosceptic Europe (e.g. in France, Austria). 
 Support for Turkey’s membership in EU countries is eroding. It means that even 
if the negotiations are closed successfully by the EU bodies such as the Council 
of Europe and European Parliament a veto on the accession treaty with Turkey 
by any national parliament of member states during the ratification process will 
prevent her accession. In countries like Austria and France where instead of 
national parliaments citizens will ratify the accession treaty in popular 
referendums public opinion makes a great sense. 
 Any referendum saying ‘no’ to the accession treaty on Turkey’s membership 
who met membership criteria would not only prevent this enlargement, but also 
it would diminish the bilateral relations. Turkish people who waited at the door 
of the EU for a long time would hold negative attitudes towards the Europeans. 
 To avoid such a situation the political elites can convince the citizens of the 
advantages/benefits rather than disadvantages/costs like influx of immigrants, 
financial and cultural concerns that Turkey can bring to Europe. The politicians 
can take some measures like limits on freedom of movement in order to remove 
such concerns. 
All this factors bring the conclusion together that public opinion is a main 
determinant in formation and an increasing opposition interrupts bilateral relations. 
3.2. How do European citizens view Turkey’s accession to the EU? 
Eurobarometer surveys of 2005-2013 conducted by European Commission show that 
public support for Turkey’s accession to the EU is not only low, but also shrinking as 
a result of a dual process: there is an increase in the rate of opposition while the level 
of support has remained stable since 2000. This is related to some transitions from 
‘don’t know’ to’No’39. Approximately, more than 55% of Europeans are against, 30% 
is for Turkey’s accession. And 11% does not know. In more details, some Euopeans 
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who had not come to any conclusion whether support or protest Turkey’s accession 
are now against it or some supporters are now in opposition since 2000 (See Table 
1).40 
Building on these surveys, Austria, France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, have the 
higher percentage of opposition. Because of trade relations and the desirable level of 
integration, the UK, Italy and Spain favoun r Turkey’s accession. In Greece, elites 
support Turkey despite the negative poll. In the countries accessed to the EU in 2004, 
except Luxembourg and Cyprus, people generally do not oppose Turkey’s 
membership. Luxembourg (~7-10%, support) and Cyprus (~8-10% support) with a 
negative public attitude towards Turkey’s accession differ from other new 
members.41 
Eurobarometer survey of 2008 under the question ‘Does a fully democratic and 
prosperous Turkey have a place in EU?’ provides an interesting result. 22% of 
respondents say ‘no’ to the accession of a full democratic and prosperous Turkey 
complied with all membership criteria.42 
The official attitude of EU member states regarding Turkey’s membership to the EU 
is mainly formulated in electoral campaigns in these countries. The government and 
the electorate are in ‘give-take’ relations. In electoral campaigns, the 
candidate’s/party’s platform is designed to ‘give’ the electorate whatever it need in 
order to attract their voices and win the election. Consequently, the candidate/party 
‘takes’ most of the voices and forms the government. Then the government tries to 
‘give’ what it had promised not to lose its legitimacy. It is a spillover. To sum up, 
legitimate democratic governments take responsibilities before their electorate. In 
some cases, the government ‘gives’ more than the need of the electorate and 
overloads it. The government, elites, uses the mass media, political discourses and 
debates, as well as electoral campaigns as the tools of propaganda. They provide 
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people with less, exaggerated or misinformation. All of these negatively damage 
Turkey’s image and her country brand. Sometimes electoral campaigns as well as the 
government are under the influence of non-state actors. The non-state actors help the 
candidate to come to power, ‘give’, and then manipulate on the government policy, 
‘take’. For example, French government policy during the presidency of Nicolas 
Sarkozy was highly regulated by Armenian lobby in France.  
3.3. How do European elites view Turkey’s accession to the EU? 
This part refers to the statements taken from the sppeches of French, German and UK 
officials. As France and Germany have been main opposers of Turkey’s EU 
membership, the UK, on the contrary, supports Turkey’s accession to the EU. This 
fact allows claim that the grouping of member states under supporting ‘new’ and 
opposing ‘old’states regarding Turkey’s accession is not always consistent. The 
negative attitude towards Turkey‘s accession in Luxembourg, a ‘new’ member state 
provides another proof for this argument. 
French elites’ attitutes towards Turkey’s membersip to the EU can be explained in 
two periods: France under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy from a right-wing party 
and of François Hollande from a left-wing party.  
In the duration of Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency, France led the opposition towards 
Turkey’s accession. French ex-president Nicolas Sarkozy highlighted identity-based 
differences between Turkey and Europe and stated in his speech: “I do not believe 
that Turkey belongs to Europe, and for a simple reason: because it is in Asia Minor. 
…what I wish to offer Turkey is a true partnership with Europe, but not integration 
into Europe”. 43 44  Apart from his rightist character the French government under 
Nicolas Sarkozy was under apparent influence of non-state actors, especially lobbies 
like Armenian lobby in France. The lobby not only suspended accession negotiation 
by blocking talks on some acquis chapters, announcing to hold referendums on 
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Turkey’s accession and raising issues related to ‘Armenian genocide’, but also 
interfered elections in France.  
The French president in power François Hollande does not hold such a radical 
negative attitude towards Turkey as Sarkozy. He gives priority to instrumental 
calculations, Turkey-EU relations and regional security. He called to open talks with 
Turkey on chapter related to EU support for region. 
One of the countries which proposed ‘privileged partnership’ with Turkey rather than 
granting her full membership and opening accession negotiations in 2005 was 
Germany. Germans resistance to Turkey’s accession still lasts. German chancellor A. 
Merkel from a right wing party has always been the most prominent defender of the 
‘Privileged Partnership’ as an alternative to full membership of Turkey. She stated in 
2011: “We are against the full EU membership of Turkey but we don’t want to lose 
such an important country”.45 
Turkish officals insistent rejection of any alternative to full membership, their 
statements pointing to Turkey’s plauseable accession to another organization and her 
economic revival on the one hand, economic crisis in EU, political and security crisis 
in the Middle East and the ‘Arab Spring’ on the other hand called for effective 
Turkish-EU relations. Consequently, A. Merkel stated in 2013: “…Although I am 
scepticalhave approved the continuation of membership discussions.We are engaging 
in this with an open result”. “.. I am in favour of opening a new chapter…”46 
The UK support Turkey’s candidacy. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom                           
D. Cameron promised to ‘fight’ for Turkey’s EU membership in his speech in 2010. 
According to his speech, EU without Turkey is “not stonger but weaker… not more 
secure but less… not richer but poorer”. 47  The UK’s favorable attitude towards 
Turkey’s EU membership differs from two ‘old’ EU member states that are already 
discussed above. The distinctions between the UK and them can be explained in two 
ways: 
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Firstly, the UK perceives the EU as the project of economic integration based on 
mutual advantages and EU seems significant for the UK as long as EU membership 
benefits it. The EU membership loses its attractiveness. The UK preserves its 
currency still. The UK has recently declared to hold a referendum on its EU 
membership. In Turkey’s case, the UK already benefits from bilateral trade with 
Turkey aims at conducting extended bilateral relations. 
Secondly, the UK has also suffered from membership bid for some years. Maybe, it is 
the common destiny that favors Turkey’s accession to the EU. 
3.4. Generalizations 
There is a five-layer division on the European public opinion: opinion of ‘top’ and 
‘down’ opinion; ‘old’ (EU-15) and ‘new’ (EU-28) member states; countries with 
large and small Turkish population; ‘The European Project’ of deep political 
integration and a federal state or economic union and mutual benefits; extreme-right 
and nationalist parties on the one hand and Liberals, Greens and the European United 
Left on the other hand.  
In some countries, the attitude towards Turkey’s accesission by ‘top’ (elite) differs 
from the ‘down’ (public): In Greece, elites support but negative opinion poll. In other 
countries, elites and the public are in the same opinion (France).   
The ‘old’ (EU-15) with political, economic and geopolitical ambitions and concerns 
are rather negative about Turkish case than the small ‘new’ (EU-28) member states.  
Countries with large Turkish population have a higher percentage of opposition 
(Germany, Austria) and offer ‘privileged partnership’ while the countries with small 
Turkish people (Poland) are more supportive  of Turkey’s EU membership.  
Defenders of ‘the European Project’ of deep political integration and a federal state 
are often reject Turkey’s accession to the EU while the defenders of economic union 
and mutual benefits support it  (the UK).  
In and outside the European Parliament, generally extreme-right and nationalist 
parties strongly oppose Turkey’s EU membership. The European People’s party is 
divided regarding Turkey’s accession. Liberals, Greens and the European United Left 
hold a favourable attitutude. 
  
IV FACTORS EFFECTING EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION ON TURKEY’S ACCESSION 
TO THE EU 
Resting on the analysis of the related literature as well as the Eurobarometer surveys 
between 2005 and 2013 held in the European countries that it includes, the thesis tries 
to overview the factors that shape European public opinion on Turkey’s membership. 
The analysis show that Europeans’ attitudes towards Turkey’s accession to the 
European Union (EU) are largely shaped under the influence of perceived, 
misperceived, really existing or highly predicted factors. It means that European 
public opinion on Turkey’s membership to the EU is not only about the 
misperceptions, but also true perceptions or rational predictions and calculations. In 
addition to official membership requirements, unofficial obstacles are also at play to 
shape Europeans opinion Turkey’s accession. The related literature often groups 
those factors into the general and particular ones. It usually describes Europeans view 
of the EU and a growing negative trend against enlargement policy as the general 
factors, and the country’s specific features like religion, culture, amount of 
population and geographical location as particular ones. Going a little further, the 
thesis groups them into Turkey-, EU-, country- and individual-specific factors that 
are of great influence in explaining the variation in Europeans’ attitudes towards 
Turkey’s EU membership. For the European mind under the manipulation of these 
factors, Turkey’s accession to the EU means that EU would import all these 
problems. 
4.1. Turkey-specific factors     
The issue of identity is usually in the center of the debates over Turkish case. Some 
Europeans claim for a unique heterogenous deep and broad integration after Turkey 
is acceded to the EU. They also appreciate the Europeanization process in Turkey 
who tries to have a European identity. According to other point of view, Turkey’s 
identity is a threat to or incompatible with the European identity.48 They are doubtful 
of the social, cultural and political harmonization between Turkish and European 
civilizations and societies. 
Comparison of the European Values Surveys of 1999-2008 presents three elements of 
European identity that form perceptions about Turkish identity:49 
- Democracy: Democratic values of Turkish and EU citizens are not wholly 
incompatible.  Turkey seems less democratic than France, the UK, Austria but 
relatively more authoritarian than Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, Orthodox 
member states. 
- Tolerance: EU as a community comprised of many different ethnic, religious, 
sexual, etc. groups are more tolerant than Turkey towards its minority groups. 
- Gender relations and equality between men and women: Turkey still cannot 
entirely get rid of the view of women at home contrary to European view of 
women at workplsce and with more independennce. 
According to these surveys, differences in regards to tolerance and gender relations 
are more visible than in terms of religion and democracy. 
The role of religion in Turkey and how religious is she? Supporters of Turkey argue 
that religious values play great role within Turkish society, but it does not differ from 
Orthodox societies in Europe.50This group guesses that Turkey’s accession to the EU 
would also remove the definition of the EU as a ‘Christian club’. Other Europeans in 
opposition justify their attitude with a reference to the influence of religion on state 
governance in Turkey and incompatibility between Islam and democracy. They 
assume that with a dominant Islamic character Turkey is the ‘other’ (99% Muslims in 
Turkey, 3% in Europe) and fear that after her accession EU would be open to Islamic 
World.51 
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Religious affiliation also seems significant in the analysis of respondents’ attitude in 
this case. Muslim respondents are more supportive of Turkey’s accession than those 
without any religious affiliation and the Christians. 
Cultural differences are always hotly debated regarding Turkey’s EU membership. 
For some Europeans, EU is not only based on economic and political criteria. They 
also care how the cultural environment will change after enlargement. Expressed 
concerns derived from Poland’s membership put forth that even Christianity is not 
sufficient for EU membership. In this regard, what about Turkey’s membership? 
A higher proportion of Europeans insist on the existence of significant cultural 
differences between Turkey and EU member states that prevent her accession. They 
affirm the description of Turkey as a culturally ‘torn’ country by S. Huntington and 
claim that because of the unfinished Europeanization initiatives since the 1920s on 
Turkey cannot be defined as a European state.52 
They also predict for the changes the increased immigration would bring to their 
culture as well as daily lives and claim for a ‘clash of civilizations’ as S. Huntington 
argues. A lower amount of Europeans views Turkey’s membership as a successful 
example and experience of multiculturalism. This group guesses that it would also 
remove the definition of the EU as a ‘Christian club’. 
Regarding European public opinion, geographical dimension can be interpreted in 
two ways: geographical location (whether Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its 
geography or not) and land size of Turkey that will give her more voices in EU 
decision-making after accession. For supporters, Turkey is a part of Europe and 
Istanbul relates Asia to Europe. For opponents, her territory (99%) is located in Asia.  
Historical dimension asks whether Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history or 
not. Supporters of Turkey’s accession, point to the history of coexistence contrary to 
the others who claim for the public fear in the EU countries against Turkey - the 
historical legacy of the Ottoman Empir.53 The contradictions on “Armenian genocide” 
are referred to as other negative example of historical legacy. Some EU member 
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states like France, Belgium, Slovakia require Turkey to recognize Armenian genocide 
before accession to the EU.54 
Large Turkish population creates fear for Europeans. Europeans calculate some 
existing/realistic and predicted costs. On the first hand, there should be shanges in the 
EU institutions after Turkey’s accession. Turkey with a large amount of population 
would have more voices within the EU in decision-making. On the second hand, the 
accession of a less developed member state of over 78 mln (78,741 mln) population 
with lots of social and economic problems is seen as another burden for Europeans. 
The Europeans should pay more for reforms in Turkey. On the third hand, Europeans 
predict for extended immigration from Turkey to EU member states after Turkey is 
granted the unlimited freedom of movement of persons/workers.55 
Membership of Croatia with small population and territory was calculated less costly 
than Turkey. 
Would there be any large immigration from Turkey to more developed EU countries? 
According to Europeans predictions, full freedom of movement adding continuous 
instability and internal problems in the country would lead to large immigration to the 
member states. They predict for economic, social and political concerns after Turks’ 
immigration. Large flow of cheap work forces into the Eurozone would create or 
increase unemployment rate and lead to redistribution of resources in EU member 
states. Turkey’s supporters present immigration of Turkish workers as flaw of young 
and cheap labour force. This argument is mostly expressed inTurkish academic 
circles rather than in Europeans calculations. 
Coexistence with Turkish people that are different from themselves in social and 
political issues, values, is regarded very problematic by Europeans. Turkish 
immigrants are poorly integrated and create their communities in the host country. 
Great number of poorly integrated Turks would be a threat to their national identity. 
They think over would Turkish people in Europe give some of their identity up and 
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become citizens of the countries they are migrated to or live in a parallel society in 
the host country.56 
For supporters of Turkey, accession of ‘young’ Turkey would rejuvenate ‘old’/ageing 
Europe.57 
Some researcher assumes that, firstly, because of the further social and economic 
developments in Turkey only a few part of the population will need to migrate to 
Europe after accession to the EU. Secondly, the member states can put restrictions on 
migration from Turkey.  
Would Turkey’s accession to the EU strengthen the regional security and stability or 
put it under threat is another dimension to explain how Europeans decide on Turkey. 
Turkey’s geopolitical location is considered beneficial to the EU by some Europeans. 
Turkey’s military capacity, her multilateral foreign policy, role of bridge between 
Asia and Europe including the Middle East, the Balkans, Asia and Africa and 
influence in Arabic states is interpreted differently in terms of security and stability 
issues. Firstly, it means to get stability in the neighbourhood of the EU and deal with 
the security thrats from the Middle East in a more fruitful way, take the supervision 
over the economic and moral developments in the region, have a broaden economic, 
trade as well as cultural ties of Europe with the Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus 
and even China. Full transformation in Turkey due to the EU membership could lead 
to the democratization, freedom and development of all Muslim countries. Otherwise, 
EU can lose Turkey in favour of non-democratic, totalitarian countries.58 Secondly, 
the EU would improve its energy security using Turkey’s transit role and diversify its 
energy roots through Turkey.  
Interpretation of Turkey’s role as a self-interested mediator instead of a bridge is 
often expressed by the opponents of Turkey’s EU membership: being a bridge means 
to mediate between the EU and the Muslim countries with committing itself to 
neither of them. They evaluate her membership as a model for democratization in 
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nondemocratic Muslim countries, but the ground for the further membership 
applications from those countries. They argue that the foreign and security issues 
only constitute two or three acquis chapters. For some Europeans, as a NATO 
member Turkey is already makes sense in Europe’s security and foreign policy. 
Europeans for whom the EU is economic-based and uses soft power Turkish military 
power loses its significance to some extent.   
The argument that Turkey’s membership would make EU a part of the conflicts in the 
Middle East is highly articulated today. Turkey is combating with terrorism and her 
national security is under the threat. EU member states are closing their doors to 
refugees from the Middle East. Turkey’s new foreign policy aspirations, her internal 
instability and growing Muslim refugees in Europe give essence to security concerns 
and make Turkey less desirable for Europeans. 59  The war over the Middle East 
between Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia, US and other states and consequent crisis of 
internal security financed abroad popularizes Turkey’s ‘aggressor’, ‘imperialist’, 
‘expansionist’ and  ’insecure’ profile. The unstable region is also seen a useful zone 
for drug trafficking. 
Reforms in Turkey during the pre-accession process significantly effect Europeans 
opinion on Turkey. Incomplete reforms and democratic deficits in Turkey favor 
negative attitudes towards Turkey.  
Turkey experienced a fast and deep process of transformation between Helsinki 
European Council of 1999 when Turkey was officially granted the status of equal 
candidate country for full membership and 2005 as accession negotiations was 
launched. During that time both major part of Turkish elites and public saw a vital 
link between the processes of Europeanization and democratization. They evaluated 
the advantages of Turkey’s EU membership in terms of economy, democracy and 
Turkey’s international role. Taking into account all of these, support to EU 
membership was high (~ 70%) in Turkey at that period.60 
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Between 2001 and 2004 some amendments concerning a range of issues such as 
gender equality as well as gender equality in marriage, women empowerment, 
protection of the freedom of expression and abolition of death penalty (2004), 
domestic violence on women and torture, etc. was made to Turkish Constitution 
drafted in 1982 under the military rule 61  
Although EU membership dream encouraged the reforming process in Turkey, due to 
the reduced credibility of EU membership in Turkey, resistance to transformation 
(not want to change and seek for protection of interests) produced by the reforms, 
imbalance of power and evaluation of “Europeanization” and “democratization” 
between old and new elites in Turkey (AKP), the aims under “Europeanization” and 
“democratization” began to differ in some sense. The latter became a more popular 
trend in Turkey backed by elites in power.62 
Turkey should continue the democratization process to have an effective and 
democratic judicial system and the system of checks and balances. It is also necessary 
in terms of the pace of Turkey-EU negotiations on acquis chapters. 
Launch of the "Positive Agenda" of 2012 on Turkey by the EU was regarded as an 
initiator of a new ‘up’ in negotiation process. However, Gezi Park demonstrations of 
June 2013 raised concerns about respect for human rights and freedoms in Turkey. 
Europe became Turkosceptic again.63 
Why democratization is still 0n the agenda? 
Transformation has been initiated under the influence of Turkish people who still 
want more democratization in the country in the period of globalisation and 
integration after the Cold War: As western countries become more democratic Turks 
also struggle for enjoying more democracy in their country. Another fact that keeps 
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democratization on track is incomplete transfer in balance of power in Turkey despite 
some reduction in the influence of the military on the state.64 
Recent developments in Turkey’s EU accession process and democratization also 
seem intertwined again. On the one hand, Turkey continues her democratic reforms. 
The “New EU Strategy of Turkey” was declared in September 2014. The New 
Strategy deals with the political reforms and social-economic transformation in 
Turkey. It also includes Communication Strategy with the EU and creation of new 
channels and speed the reforms up. The Communication Strategy was developed to 
strengthen the support to Turkey’s accession to the EU both by Turks and Europeans 
and achieve mutual confidence. Building on the New EU Strategy, Turkey prepared 
her “National Action Plan for the Accession to the EU”. The plan is in the form of a 
roadmap for reforms and transformation in Turkey covering 2014-2019.65 
Nowadays, Turkish government is also working on a new more democratic 
constitution for some time. It has become the major issue of the government’s 
agenda. However, polarization between political parties and domestic instability 
make it a hard task. 
In his New Year speech (31 Dec. 2015), Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu 
announced of a new constitution under the preparation by his government that targets 
“advanced democracy” in Turkey.  The Prime Minister described it as political 
contract to be proudable for every citizen of Turkey.66 
Will Turkey fully respect human rights after EU accession? According to 
Commission reports, elite opinions and Eurobarometer surveys on public opinion, 
human rights issue is a leading dimension for opposition and delay in the accession. 
Turcophile authors argue that although the reforms have brought significant changes 
to Turkish economy, military and political institutions as well as political culture, the 
accession process has not sped up. However, in fact, the reforms in human rights 
during the accession process are incomplete and more apparent on paper than in 
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reality according to Europeans’ perceptions. They claim for less respect for religious 
and ethnic minority rights (Kurds) including difficulties in using their languages, lack 
of gender equality, violence, discrimination against women, lack of social rights, 
limited freedom of speech and press in Turkey. Some of them even do not hesitate to 
argue that Muslims in the EU enjoy more rights than Christians or other ethnics do in 
Turkey. The recent processes took place in Turkey flamed debates some steps 
backward, especially with regard to the freedom of press in this country. The slow 
implementation of reforms or deficits regarding human rights and freedoms leads to 
suspensions and favor opposition to Turkey’s EU membership. Europeans wonder 
whether the changes after reforms would be in force after the accession. 
Will Turkey’s accession largely improve the state economy? Economic dimension is 
explained from two aspects. Firstly, Turkey’s economic condition, secondly, the 
benefits of her accession. Economically highly developed Turkey is less costly and 
dangerous for Europeans perceptions. She would pay more to the EU and need less. 
The more Europeans believe in the economic gains of Turkey’s entry, the less they 
see cultural distinctions, the higher will be the rate of support to her. Economic 
advantages of EU membership like to reduce unemployment and poverty is stressed 
to outweigh political or social ones in evaluations of some Europeans. Thus, the term 
of advantages of membership to the European Union is sometimes linked with the 
term of prosperity. Predicted wealth-oriented advantages or predicted threats to 
existing economic advantages manipulate approval of enlargement. This hypothesis 
mostly relevant for new member states of the EU.67 
To be a beneficiary or benefactory economy and the amount of immigrants highly 
influence on the attitudes. Citizens in beneficiary countries and the ones with lower 
proportion immigrants usually think of Turkish accession in a more positive way than 
the opposite side.68 
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According to the supporters, Turkey is one of the most rising economy. Turkey has 
regulated her financial markets and banking systems, succeeded in economic 
integration with the EU, diversified her trade relations. Turkey is the largest trade 
partner of the EU. 69 
All in all, in comparison with the enlargement of 2004 and 2007, the economic 
circumstances seem relevant for membership. To add more, this membership can 
revive European and Asian markets. The accession of Turkey with a large economic 
potential (the 7th largest economy in Europe and 18th in the world)70 will widen the 
European market and make it more competitive to fight against economic challenges. 
The opposition argues that Turkey’s GDP per capita is under European standards. 
The membership of Turkey with a large agricultural sector and population over 70 
million will bring some changes in budget allocation for the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and reinforce influx of less-skilled labor immigration. 
Both developed and developing countries suffer from regional inequalities. However, 
this concern is more evident in less-developed countries like Turkey. 
Because of georaphycal, historical, socio-econoimc, cultural and other reasons, 
Turkey is inequally developd. The west of Turkey is rich in natural resources, 
advantageous climate, and means of communication and workfoce, close to European 
market, highly invested by the western capital and modernised. However, the east and 
south-east of Turkey builds on“ashiret” structure, suffers from the lack of educated, 
high-skilled human forces, modernization, sufficient profit, material capital, GDP per 
capita, developed social institution and services.71  
Confusion between Turkish elites over defining Turkey’s future role as an actor of 
international arena also blurs Europeans mind and raises disapproaval rate of 
Turkey’s accession. Vision of Turkey as an international actor by Turkish elites 
differs. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)) have 
always had aspirations for Europeanization and EU membership for some years. 
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Despite being accused of Euroscepticism, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi (CHP)) sounds pro-EU nowadays. 72  73  The Nationalist Action Party 
(Milliyetçi Haraket Partisi (MHP)) calls for preservation of Turkish nationality as 
well as national unity and rejects the impact of Westernization on Turkish identity.74 
The protection of human rights and freedoms, particularly freedom of expression and 
freedom of press in Turkey is evaluated under EU standards by the People’s 
Democratic Party (Halk Demokratik Partisi (HDP)).75 
In order to provide accurate information, it is useful to make a reference to the 
parties’ election manifestos of June 2015.  
The election manifestos of the major political parties made for the general elections 
in Turkey provide a considerable reference to analyze Turkish elites view over 
Turkey’s future role as an international actor and her EU membership. It is relevant to 
pick the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the People’s Democratic Party 
(HDP) up and discuss the place of the EU in the elections of June 2015. 
The AKP’s policies related to Turkey’s foreign policy issues is organized under the 
“Visionary and Leader State” within the election manifesto.76 The election manifestos 
of the Party made in 2015 and before sounds favorable in terms of Turkey’s EU 
membership. The AKP, the leading party, has continuously presented Turkey’s 
membership to the EU as a strategic foreign policy goal. The AKP leaders has often 
expressed that Turkey’s economy is in rise and the EU needs Turkey to handle its 
internal economic crises. They evaluate EU membership as a part of Turkey’s foreign 
relations, not an alternative to the relations with other countries.77 
Within their election manifesto, the social democrat party, CHP, presents foreign 
policy issues in the chapter “Citizens and Value Based Foreign Policy”. CHP is the 
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party that gave place to these matters in the first chapter of the party manifesto and 
sounds pro-EU accession. In its manifesto, it claims that Turkey under its governance 
can be granted EU membership. Like AKP it also points to economic and security 
advantages for the EU of Turkey’s accession.78 
The chapter under the title “Foreign Policy” of the centre-right nationalist party, 
MHP, confirms the fact that relations with other Turkic states come before Turkey-
EU relations in the Party’s view. The Party, the third political force in the country, 
poses a clear Eurosceptic profile in its manifesto. MHP defines Turkey as a “regional 
power” and a “global power” independent of EU membership. It mentions the open-
ended and uncertain character of Turkey’s membership that it does not approve. MHP 
expects the EU to respect Turkey’s national interests. The Party with national 
ideology calls to protect the national unity. It argues that Turkey’s relations with 
Greece, Cyprus and Armenia and threat of terrorism should be settled in order to 
continue accession negotiations with EU.79 
In its short manifesto, the fourth political force in Turkey, HDP sums foreign policy 
issues up under the “Equalitarian, Emancipatory and Peaceful Foreign Policy”. In 
accordance with its domestic policy priorities, the Party backs the principles pushed 
forward by the EU. It is insistent on the lack of protection of human rights, rule of 
law, separation of power and democracy that the EU membership criteria include. 80 
81 
Therefore, it sounds realistic that the major political forces attitudes towards the place 
of EU membership in Turkish foreign policy contradict and sometimes are confused. 
Loss of popularity of EU membership in Turkey also becomes obvious. The 
contradiction and confusion among main political forces regarding Turkey’s 
orientation decrease support to EU membership by Turkish public and are highly 
related with the interruptions in reforms.  
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The problems over the Cyprus issue also effect Europeans opinion on Turkish case. 
They blame Turkey in “occupying” the northern part of and not to recognize Greek 
Cyprus that is a member of the EU since 2004. This conflict favors Turkey’s image 
as an occupant country that the Ottoman legacy had already drawn in European mind.  
Accordingly, the problems in the customs union after Turkey’s accession are highly 
predicted by Europeans.  
This conflict is not only significant in shaping attitudes of ordinary citizens, but also 
causes to the crucial stumbling blocks in negotiation process on chapters with Turkey. 
However the Cyprus problem was not a prerequisite for the membersip of Cyprus, in 
addition to Copenhagen criteria for membership, the Negotiation Framework between 
the EU and Turkey set out on October 3 2005 includes three other requirements for 
Turkey’s accession:82 
 First additional criterion for Turkey’s membership requires Turkey to take 
unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations and resolution of any 
well-known border disputes in accordance with the principle of peaceful 
settlement that the United Nations Charter defines. It also includes the 
possibility of jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice.  
 Second additional criterion calls for the necessity of uninterrupted support by 
Turkey to efforts for effective settlment of the Cyprus issue within the United 
Nations framework and the founding principles. It appreciates success in 
normalisation of bilateral relations of Turkey with all EU member states. As 
the Greek Cyprus is an EU member, Turkey is required to conduct normal 
bilateral relations with it.  
 Third additional criterion demands Turkey the implementation of the 
obligations that she took by signing the Association Agreement and its 
Additional Protocol. Turkey still rejects the recognition of the Republic of 
Cyprus and refuses opening its sea and air ports to Cypriot vessels on the 
contrary to the agreement on customs union. Turkey’s rejection to apply the 
Additional Protocol to Cyprus resulted in the EU Council’s decision to freeze 
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negotiations on 8 chapters in December 2006 (“Free Movement of Goods”; 
“Right of Establishment for Companies & Freedom To Provide Services”; 
“Financial Services”; “Agriculture & Rural Development”; “Fisheries”; 
“Transport Policy”; “Customs Union”; “External Relations”). 
The ‘Armenian genocide’ is another popular stumbling-block in Turkey’s accession 
to the EU. It is a ‘Turkey-specified’ issue in this case. 
After the independence of Armenia the Armenian factor, in the form of Armenian 
claims and Turkish-Armenian relations, became a topic of disputes on Turkey’s EU 
membership. From time to time, European officials make proposals to put the 
recognition of the ‘systematic massacres of Armenians in 1915’ as a precondition for 
Turkey’s accession to the EU despite it is not reflected in the Copenhagen Criteria.  
At the institutional level, there are differences in stance of EU. Nevertheless, the 
resolution that the European Parliament adopted in 1987 is always referred to by 
Europeans. The European Parliament has usually had the most open stance towards 
‘genocide’ claims of Armenians among EU institutions. The European Parliament 
passed a resolution on June 18 1987, only after three months from Turkey’s 
membership application. In its resolution on a political solution to the Armenian 
question the European Parliament recognised the tragic events of 1915-1917 
involving the Armenians settled in the territory of the Ottoman Empire as a genocide. 
83 
The European Parliament directly relates the possibility of Turkey’s full EU 
membership with the recognition of the ‘genocide’ by Turkey. It calls Turkey to 
recognize the ‘genocide’ and defines the recognition as a prerequisite to EU 
accession.84 
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In its turn, European Commission focuses not on Armenian claims to ‘genocide’, but 
situation of minorities in Turkey and Turkish-Armenian relations in its progress 
report on accession process.85 
France, Greece and Greek Cypriots are the major supporter of it. In 1996, Greek 
Parliament recognized 24 April as the memorial day of the ‘genocide’ of Armenians 
of Turks. In 1998 and 2001, French Parliament adopted a decision expressing that 
France openly recognizes the ‘Armenian genocide’. In 2006, French National 
Parliament proposed a draft on criminalization of the denial of ‘Armenian genocide’ 
and defined punishment up to 5 years and 45000 Euro. Although the draft was 
accepted by the Senate, due to the appeal of other member states that insisted on the 
contradiction between the draft and the Constitution, the Constitution Council 
cancelled it. The denial of ‘Armenian genocide’ is criminalized in Cyprus. Belgium 
Senate took a decision requiring (asking) Turkey to recognize the ‘genocide’ in 1998 
and 2015. Italy also criminalized denial of the ‘Armenian genocide’. In 2004 the 
Netherland and Slovenia, in 2005, Poland, Lithuania and Germany, in 2010 Sweden 
recognized the ‘genocide’. Denial of the ‘genocide’ was criminalized with 
punishment up to five years in prison in 2011 in Slovakia. The Netherland passed 
bills recognizing the ‘genocide’ in 2004 and 2015.  In 2015 Germany, Bulgaria, 
Austria, Czech Republic and Luxembourg recognized the “genocide”. 86 
 The activities of Armenian diaspora and lobby are particularly effective factors in 
shapeing Europeans attitudes and policies related to Turkey. 
The Turkish government reject and does not accept the requirement for recognition as 
a part of EU accession criteria. The European Parliament voted against such a formal 
proposal in 2006 and 2011 as well.87 
EU institutions’ and member states’ attitudes, policies as well as decisions on 
Armenian issue impact Turkey-EU relations and bilateral relations between Turkey 
and member states.  
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In some evaluations whether conducted by Europeans or not, Turkey’s EU 
membership bid cannot removed before the resolution of ‘Armenian issue’. 
The conflicts over this issue are subject of elites’ and citizens’ debates over Turkey. It 
sounds as an elitist matter rather than populist. Going into the details, the elites are 
rather engaged in this matter and increase its significance for citizens.  
The other part of Europeans are concerned of Turkey’s uncertainties, the recent 
changes in Turkey’s policy, economy and religion, and have difficulties to predict 
what is next. The gap between Turkey’s expectations and capabilities, in other words, 
deficits, instable internal developments and external relations that every change in 
government has brought to Turkey make her membership prospects fail.88 A great 
amount of Europeans is concerned of the risks related to immigration, employment, 
political reforms and so on. According to some circles, the recent transitions in 
Turkey’s foreign policy orientation from the Western one to an independent and 
unstable one contradicts with her EU membership prospects. On the one hand, the 
new Turkish policy that is often coined as ‘Euroasianism’ raises suspicions about the 
disappearance of Turkey’s aims for EU membership.89 
The most crucial dimension is the image of the candidate country in EU member 
states. So that the image and perception of Turkey, its brand plays a rather great role 
in formation of the European public opinion on her accession.The significance of all 
these abovementioned factors changes in accordance with the image of Turkey in the 
member states. Having a ‘negative country brand’ leads respontends opposition and 
suspecions regarding the membership of even a more democratic Turkey.  
How is Turkey’s image in Europe shaped? Turkey’s image in Europe is shaped in 
European cities like Berlin, London, Paris and Amsterdam, not in Istanbul or even in 
the US cities. Whatever Turks do or success in Turkey is of minimum influence on 
the formation of the image of Turkey in Europe. In Europeans evaluations, any big 
success that Turks make in relation with other countries can be removed away by any 
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aggression that a Turk do (success) in Europe. Less-educated Turks in Europe say 
more of Turkey to Europeans than a highly educated Turkey. There are also favorable 
samples of practice with Turks in Europe, but a range of factors reduce the influence 
of  “good” Turks in shaping Turkey’s image.90 
The mass media, political discourses and debates, electoral campaigns, non-state 
actors like Armenian diasporas and lobbies in Europe, less or misinformation, poor 
experience with Turk immigrants and perceived threats to national identity, 
Euroscepticism, Turkophobia and Islamophobia flamed by terrorism, radicalism and 
instability are at play in shaping Turkey’s present country profile. 
Europeans are evaluated as “Turcosceptic”, but Turks as “Eurosceptic”. 
“Euroscepticism” in Turkey is the sample of distrust between the Europeans and 
Turks or felt threat to Turkish national identity. A dual process goes on: the rise of 
“Turcoscepticism” in Europe raises “Euroscepticism” in Turkey, or vice versa. 
Europeans claim that Euroscepticism in Turkey interrupts reforms and 
Europeanization policy in Turkey, and, consequently, declines support to Turkey’s 
accession by Europeans. 
4.2. EU-specific factors 
Contradictions on the definition of the European integration project and preferences 
concerning the European integration process also suspend Turkey’s accession. 
Europeans have dispute over the future role of the EU whether as a strong political 
entity or a common market. Some studies present it as the conflict of a ‘thick’ 
idea/perception of Europe rooted in identity-based terms and a ‘thin’ idea of Europe 
rooted in normative and legalistic terms (such as democracy, human rights and rule of 
law, etc.).91 According to these studies, the controversial character of Turkey’s bid for 
membership stems from the complex intersection of these two opposite views of the 
EU. They find a ‘thin’ EU favoring Turkey’s accession. It means that after complying 
with all Copenhagen criteria and adopting the EU’s acquis, Turkey can be granted 
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full-fledged membership. On the contrary, the ‘thick’ EU rooted in identity and 
culture is supposed to challenge Turkey’s membership. To sum up, the member states 
seeking for extension of the common market or possessing the ‘thin’ idea of Europe 
are usually for Turkey’s accession and claim to have more international influence if 
Turkey is in. However, other Europeans take into account Turkey’s unstable 
geopolitical location and foreign policy that is sometimes very hard to make 
predictions on. They consider it as a choice of quantity or quality. 
In addition to Turkish uncertainties European uncertainties over political and 
geographical limits of EU also raise opposition to Turkey.92 Turkey’s membership to 
the Union is considered as a violation of its founding treaties like historical and legal 
aspects, geographical limits. 
In some studies, the EU’s one-fit all strategy, the strategy of applying the same 
accession policy to different countries is also perceived as a reason to failure of 
enlargement policy.93 As long as enlargement fails any further expansion irritates the 
public. The EU is called to apply individual accession policy on any candidate 
country. 
EU’s readiness to enlargement at the political, economic and institutional level is 
another crucial factor to change the public opinion. Firstly, EU should be ready in 
order to settle difficulties that the enlargement will bring. Secondly, European people 
should be well-informed and conceived of this readiness. There are two possible 
scenarios: EU is ready to the enlargement but citizens are unaware of it; EU is 
unready to the enlargement but citizens are convinced of or subjectively perceive its 
readiness; EU is ready and the citizens are aware of it because of direct exchange of 
information between them; EU is unready and citizens know this fact because of 
direct exchange of information between them. In Turkey’s case, the second and third 
scenarios favor her membership whereas the second one is more costless for both EU 
and Turkey. 
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EU’s internal economic, fiscal and identity crises push Turkey’s membership out of 
the centre of EU agenda. Politicians engage in domestic problems rather than putting 
enlargement in public agenda. Political, economic and identity crises of Europe (like 
crisis of distribution, crisis of political representation and the crisis of identity, 
growing global economic uncertainty, immigration) give rise to the extreme-rights in 
many Western countries. 94  Because of these facts the elite consensus between 
mainstream parties on exclusion of the extremist parties from the political arena 
gradually came to an end and they leave more places to the extremists. The extreme-
right parties successfully use media and tend to come to centre in order to represent 
the majority of the electorate.95 The debate on Turkey’s accession to the EU flames 
the crisis of European identity and definition of Europe. In its turn, the debaate on 
European identity is ratherly focused on what Europeaness is not, rather than what it 
is”.96  
According to a prominent number of concerned studies, the acceptance of the 
membership application of Turkey, a prominent energy transit hub, an ally of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an effective one to cooperate in the Middle East, 
the Black Sea region and the Caucasus, and the launch of negotiations was backed by 
the US Congress. The US viewed the EU enlargement process as a way to spread the 
stability and development in Europe.97 They accuse the EU members of being inable 
to develop a common policy and remove this pressure. Uncertainties in the case are 
explained with the character of transatlantic relations rather than EU-Turkish. These 
studies, by Turkish or European researchers, refer to‘buy time policy’ as the main 
goal of the EU in launching pre-accession negotiations with Turkey. 
Ukraine crisis is also another fact prevealing the weakness and deficits of EU foreign 
policy including the enlargement policy. The crisis reconfirmed that not Turkey’s 
membership but the third actors and Ukrainians have much to do with Ukraine’s 
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membership. The EU under the influence of the policy of the third actors may access 
Turkey one day. Here raises another question that any further research can rest on: is 
Turkey’s accession prevented by any third actor (s)? 
The researches claim for an eroding US support because of the recent changes in 
Turkey’s foreign policy 98 . Because of the last political changes and conflict of 
interests in the Middle East, to revive US backing of Turkey’s EU membership and 
Turkey’s EU membership would be a way to keep her under supervision. 
It is hotly debated whether opposition to Turkish membership is related especially to 
Turkey, or a general negative trend towards enlargement, in other words, 
enlargement fatigue. Respondents’ negative attitudes towards Turkey’s accession are 
often due to the opposition to EU’s enlargement policy. Europeans do not want EU to 
expand further and import additional problems. Domestic problems and unfavorable 
experiences with previous rounds of enlargements of 2004 and 2007 make 
enlargement undesirable.99 
The open-ended character of the accession process that the EU Council’s decision on 
Turkey rasied scepticism and hopelesness, and led to the loss of credibility of her 
membership prospects. All began to think of Turkey’s candidacy as a ‘specific case’. 
It is the very ‘specificness’ that complicates candidacy of Turkey. To attach an open-
ended character removed guarantee of membership. On the one hand, Turks felt to be 
unfairly treated cannot calculate the costs and benefits of the process surely: do the 
costly transformation will definitely end in accession? On the other hand, Europeans 
confidennt of their elites percieve it as a caution and become more sceptic towards 
Turkey’s accession. Both these facts slow the transformation and negotiation process 
down.  
Alternatives to Turkey’s full EU membership such as the Privileged Partnership (PP) 
alo reduce credibility of the accession. The project of PP with Turkey (2002) 
proposes expansion of the Customs Union into the free movement of goods, services 
and capital without free movement of persons. It is generally considered as imperfect 
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project with shortages devised to replace the full membership and keep the relations 
on without including or excluding Turkey. The European Parliament supports the PP 
as a form of promoted neighborhood policy without the freedom of movement of 
persons. Some Europeans predicted for a difficult and unfair competetion with 
Turkey in a single market. Turkish officials oppose the costly PP (in terms of 
implementation of the acquis) without any participation in decision-making and 
predicts for the hardship in management: cost exceeds benefits in Turkish 
calculations.  
According to a set of academic circles, economic (expansion of the existing borders 
of European market), security (to have a buffer zone, Turkey, between two continents 
and combate illegal immigration and terrorism, diversificate energy supply to the EU 
countries) reasons and declining public support for enlargement, in other words, 
enlargement fatigue are the main factors lying behind the offer of PP. They describe 
the strategic partnership trough the PP as a way to have another buffer zone between 
Asia and Europe, integrate the Turkish and EU military power and eliminate any 
military threat from Turkey.  
The PP offer is also criticized for being limited to economic and security matters, 
leading to slow-down in reforms, diminishing Turkish public wish for EU 
membership and failing to provide the reason of complying with the acquis without 
granting membership.100 
Negative assessments of the pre-accession negotiations by the EU also impact on 
formation of European decisions regarding the membership of Turkey. 2012 progress 
report of the EU Commission on Turkey’s pre-accession process largely focused on 
democratic deficits in the country and Cyprus problem is considered to be “the 
harshest” and “unbalanced” one by Turkish officials. Harsh criticism by the EU 
institutions leave less hope for Turkey’s EU membership supporters and create such a 
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perception that both the EU and Turkey are not as interested in membership as they 
were before. 101  
European’s ‘phobia’, in other words Turcoscepticism and Turcophobia are perceived 
as hostility towards Turks, Turkic culture, Ottoman Empire and Turkey. Sometimes 
Turcophobia is presented as a historical process taking its roots from Turkish 
occupation in the fifteenh century. Some Turkish authors even do not hesitate to 
claim that it is Turcophobia and Islamophobia that created the EU which Turkey tries 
to access now. They argue that the idea of EU appeared after the occupation of 
Istanbul by Turks. At that time, its defenders targeted to ensure peace and exclusion 
of Turks from Europe. 102 
According to some Europeans, the “other” in Europe has transformed from the Jews 
and communists to Muslims. The new “other” of Europeans is the “enemy from 
within”, usually a Muslim immigrant. 103 The rise of radical Islamophobia in the post-
9-11 era leads to Turcophobia in Europe and it, in its turn, leads to Euroscepticism in 
Turkey (‘negative spillovers’). 104  Turkish membership to the EU is sometimes 
perceived as an instrument of Islamization of Europe.  Paris terror attacks of 2015 
and flaw of Syrian refugees due to the war in Syria that broke out in the form of civil 
war and turned into regional war leaded by internal and external forces escalated the 
level of ‘Islamophobia’ in Europe.  
The rise of right-wing parties and rightwing propaganda in member states will also 
raise Islamophobia, or specifically “Turcophobia” across Europe.105  
Both Islamophobia and Turkophobia in Europe havet become the most dangerous 
modern tendencies threatening the success in Turkey’s application. Some political 
elites and academic studies with anti-Islam or anti-Turkish propaganda and mutual 
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distrust also contribute to Euroscepticism in Turkey and Turcophobia in Europe. It 
means that realistic and misperceived considerations affect European opinion. 
In European perceptions, if Turkey is accessed to the EU once, to prevent 
membership applications from the outside of European borders will be impossible.106 
The thesis calls it ‘enlargement disease phobia’.  
4.3. Individual-specific factors 
The result of the analysis on Eurobaromter Surveys of the 2000s reveals the fact that 
the respondents are also influenced by individual-specific factors in discussing 
Turkey’s membership. There are other factors at play such as people's levels of 
education, age, gender and ideological affiliation to make generalizations over the 
different attitudes towards this enlargement. 
Not only really-felt concerns and rational calculations, but also individual perceptions 
about the country’s features shape Europeans’ attitudes towards Turkey’s EU 
accession. Differences in respondents’ attitudes towards the same Turkey-, EU- and 
country-specific factors are explained with the fact that they conform to reality or 
reflect individual perceptions. The perception of factors by individuals is subjective 
or objective. These concerns are sometimes misperceived, exaggerated or lover 
estimated.  
It is also relevant to use individual beliefs concerningTurkish and European 
commonalities or distinctions, the benefits or costs of membership for Turkey and the 
EU sometimes explain variations in Europeans’ attitudes. The less the individuals 
believe that Turkey and Europe share the same cultural norms, history and 
geography, the more they are supportive of Turkey’s accession. The stronger the 
individuals are conceived of that Turkey’s membership will bring benefits to the EU, 
the more likely they support Turkey’s accession. The stronger the respondents 
believe that Turkey will benefit from the EU, the stronger they will support Turkey’s 
accession. 
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There are contradictions in academic circles over individual’s attitudes towards 
Turkey and their level of education. Some argue that more educated individuals are 
more supportive of Turkey’s accession contrary to those who claim for the negative 
relation between these variables.107 It seems rather relevant that the less educated 
respondents are more supportive of Turkey’s EU accession than well-educated ones. 
It is mainly due to the higher level of information and the degree of analytic capacity 
of well-educated respondents. 
Although accession of an economically less developed country is perceived as a 
threat to their wealth by Europeans, dilemma on the type of relation between 
personal economic position/personal wealth and individual’s opinion on Turkey is 
also evident. Some researchers argue that the rich and employed individuals are 
relatively more supportive of Turkey’s accession than the poor and unemployed ones. 
It can be explained with the assumption that the rich and employed, high-skilled 
Europeans are in comfort and economically secure. However, this study finds it 
appropriate to the accession of a highly developed country where the high-skilled 
citizens hope for new job opportunities. Actually, in some cases personal economic 
position and attitudes towards Turkey’s accession are negatively related. The 
individuals with a better economic position feel threat to their wealth and worry more 
than the individuals who have less to lose (it is indifferent to them). This scenery can 
vary in different individuals, because of subjectively perceived economic position or 
national economic preferences. 
Age of respondents also also helps to explain the variations in Europians behavior. 
Younger respondents, who place themselves mostly in the left of the political 
spectrum, are more predicted to support Turkey‘s accession. The older, who seems 
themselves on the right, usually hold nationalist sentiments. They are for the 
preservation of European project of political integration and European identity unlike 
the younger who seek for materialistic benefits and peaceful coexistence.  
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The analysis of surveys makes it apparent to make a generalization building on 
another dimension, gender affiliation. Considering the effect of other factors as well, 
the women seem more in favor of Turkey’s membership than the men.108 Firstly, this 
study relates it to the differences in masculine and feminine characters and, secondly, 
to their role and interest in politics. 
In terms of ideological affiliation, individuals on the political right-wing are more 
likely to oppose Turkey’s admittance. As was mentioned in the study before, they 
view the EU as a ‘Christian club’ and political project with the final goal of 
federation of European states. Apart from it, they consider the accession of Turkey as 
the threat to European identity and redistribution of their wealth. The rights predict to 
give up some European identity in order to live with Turks who are not Europeans. 
They consider that Europe is only for Europeans. 109  Individuals who place 
themselves on the left-wing of the political spectrum are materialistic than the rights. 
They view the EU as an economic project and seek for additional resources. 
Nowadays, the right-wing parties are winning national elections in EU member 
states. It can be interpreted as the flame of nationalism, Islamophobia, 
Turcoscepticsm and anti-enlargement attitudes in Europe.  
Due to the religious commonality Muslims in Europe support Turkey membership 
rather than Christians or people without any religious affiliation. The Christians 
oppose more than religiously indifferent ones.  
Being informative of Turkey and EU specific factors positively or negatively 
influences on support to her accession. Having entire information about the problems 
or costs raises opposition to Turkey while being aware of the progress in Turkey and 
benefits of her accession increases support to her EU membership. Sometimes 
misinformation about the EU, its enlargement policy and Turkey are the factors that 
make Europeans oppose enlargement. Some Europeans do not have detailed 
information about the EU as well as its institutions, functions and enlargement policy. 
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4.4. Country-specific factors 
Apart from Turkey-, EU- and individual-specific factors, country-specific factors 
such as country’s economic performance, the amount of Turkish migrants also have 
much to do with the level of public approval/disapproval rate of Turkey’s EU 
membership in an EU member state. Interaction between integration and national 
political, economic and social settings produce diverse combinations of incentives, 
expectations and fears. 110 
Considering the contradictions over the  view of EU and its enlargement policy by 
the member states, most related researches make groupings of “old” (EU 15) and 
“new” (EU 25-27) member states and claim that in the former ones support for 
Turkey’s EU membership is low, while in latter ones support is relatively high. 
Citizens in old EU-15 member states (especially, Austria, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Greece, France and Finland) more oppose Turkey’s accession than in the ten new 
member states.111  “Old” member states view the European integration project as 
political unification based on common European identity contrary to the “new” 
member states for which the union is based on materialistic benefits. In identity based 
perspective, this unification in the form of enlargement should not consider Turkey 
who belongs to Asian identity. In a materialistic perspective, the internal problems 
caused by economic, financial and security crises made EU enlargement policy less 
attractive for Europeans. In other words, a new member seems extra burden for the 
“fathers of EU” to deal with.  In an institusional perspective, the “old” members 
enjoy the right to supervise on EU policy. Accession of Turkey with large population 
will give more voices to her in EU decision-making. The interest of Turkey with a 
pro-Arabic foreign policy orientation will contradict with other member states.  The 
“new” member states evaluate Turkey’s accession as the expansion of common 
market and inclusion of new materialistic resources, like a boost in exhausted EU 
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economy.  That is why economic circles are usually keen supporters of Turkey’s 
membship.112  
The contrast between the amount of Turkish population/migrants in an EU member 
state (e.g. Germany, Austria and Netherlands with the highest percentage of Turkish 
immigrants), a host country, and the rate of public support to Turkey’s accession 
raises another dilemma: the higher the percentage of Turks living in a country, the 
more the population is likely to oppose Turkey’s accession. 113  In this regard, 
Europeans’ experience with Turkish immigrants who often find it difficult to 
integrate into the societies of host countries, the cultural difference between Turkey 
and the EU, misinformation about Turkey and Turkish community, social image of 
Turkey and the Turks in Europe (largely stemmed from the lack of Turks’ 
educational and vocational qualifications, low-paying unskilled jobs, family relations, 
loyalty to traditions and so on) contribute to disapproval rate of its accession to the 
EU.114 
Evaluations of the financial costs that Turkey’s EU membership will bring to EU 
member states also influences on public opinion regarding her accession. To be a 
beneficiary or benefactory economy highly influence on the attitudes. Citizens in 
recipient/beneficiary countries are more supportive of Turkey’s accession than the 
citizens in benefactory countries. On he one hand, those who are conceived of the 
profits that their country get from EU membership favor Turkish accession than those 
who do not see significant profit in their own membership.115 On the other hand, 
citizens of these countries focused on the benefits that EU emembership gives them 
rather than on the possible costs that Turkey’s membership can bring together.  
National political context, certain macro-level political variables (such as 
government ideology or the economic health of the country) and political elites’ role 
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have unavoidable impact on individual preferences or perceptions in this case: a 
right-wing government usually holds Turkosceptic attitudes. In other words, support 
to Turkey’s accession is in decline in EU members where right-wing governments are 
in power. The growing influence of extreme-right parties which are conservative 
about protection of national identity and redistribution of social benefits poses threat 
to Turkey’s EU membership. The largely sounded concerns of ultranationalist, 
authoritarian, radical, populist or xenophobic extreme-right parties related to anti-
immigrant attitudes could be categorized into moral (identity-based) and material 
ones. The extreme-rights oppose pluralist democracy and division of social benefits 
among these groups: the dominant group should get most of the benefits and leave 
restricted choices for immigrants. Extreme-right parties with their anti-immigration, 
anti-globalization, anti-multicultural and Islamophobic views boost restricted 
citizenship regulations, flame violence against immigrants and increase opposition 
towards Turkey’s membership. They argue that these countries do not need 
immigrant workers any more.116 They portray Turks as a new “other” in Europe. 
Because of influential extreme-right parties, Germany and Austria show the lowest 
rate of support for Muslim and less-developed Turkey’s membership, an instrument 
of Islamization of Europe. They flame the fear of influx of further immigrants if 
Turkey becomes a member of the EU. 117  
As long as right-wing parties control the debate over Turkish accession and use 
European media as a policy tool EU citizens will hold negative attitude towards 
Turkey. In order to change the scenery in Turkey’s favour, the debate must 
concentrate on post-national and instrumental arguments rather than identitarian or 
cultural ones. 
How the ideology of the government effect citizens’ opion on Turkey’s EU 
membership? Actually, in some European countries, national governments and 
ideologies decrease the rate of public support to Turkey’s accession whereas in other 
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European countries political elites act according to the public will and tend to be 
more attractive for the voters or party members. 
Bargaining power of the member states is a prominent factor that effects the relations 
between the member and candidate states of the EU. From time to time member 
states bargained against or for candidate states in previous enlargements. It is 
considered most relevant for Turkey’s case by pointing to lots of turning points in the 
pre-accession process.118 
Greece is accused of using its bargaining power in favor of its own foreign policy 
goals since it was accessed to the the EU. Ruquirement for unanimity and veto power 
of member states in EU decision-making process on external relations in accordance 
with Luxembourg compromise (1966) allows bargain. 
Using the institutional structure of the EU, Greece created obstacles in decisions 
regarding Turkey’s accession. Luxembourg Summit in 1997 decided on the 
candidacy of the applicant states, including Cyprus, with exclusion of Turkey. During 
1998 Greece used its bargaining power and prevented any new proposals for Turkey 
by the UK and Germany. Only two years later, Helsinki Summit of 1999 granted 
candidat status to Turkey despite the absence of any important development in 
Turkey. Greece did not oppose the decision of Helsinki Summit. Because, firstly, 
Cyprus conflict was Europeanized and Grece received guarantee from the EU for the 
membership of Cyprus in 2004 during the fifth round of enlargement despite it was 
Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus who backed the Annan Plan for 
Cyprus. (In additon to the bargaining power of Greece, instrumental calculations also 
favord the accession: Cyprus is a country of small population and territory). 
Secondly, EU had to deal with Turkey’s requirements. Thirdly, Abdullah Ocalan, 
PKK leader, was captured in Greece Embassy in Kenya in the same year. Fianally, 
reapprochment between Greece and Turkey also contributed to approval of Turkey’s 
candidacy to the EU membership in 1999. 
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Despite the fact that the bargaining power of Greece, a member state, was not the 
only reason in Turkey’s EU membership bid, it was a tool for EU members who 
wanted to ‘buy time’. That is why Europeanization of Turco-Cypriot conflict 
prevented Turkey’s candidacy to the EU. Bargaining member states caaried this 
conflict to decision-making of the EU.  
The ups and downs in the pre-accession negotiations are also sometimes explained 
with the bargaining power of Greece. The EU Council has decided to freeze 
negotiations on 8 chapters in December 2006. According to the statement by the 
Council of the European Union in December 2006, as long as the free movement of 
goods by ships and planes registered in Cyprus is restricted Turkey will not be able to 
fullt implement the acquis cencerned these chapters.119 Following decisions of French 
and Cypriot governments to block negotiations on acquis chapters between Turkey 
and EU are other out-standing examples to prove bargaining power of member states. 
Negotiations between EU and Turkey on 17 chapters out of 35 had been frozen by the 
EU Council, France and Cyprus. Negotiations on 2 chapters (“Regional Policy & 
Coordination of Structural Instruments” (2013); "Economic & Monetary Policy" 
(2015)) are unfrozen.120121 Turkey’s refusal to recognize ‘the Republic of Cyprus’ and 
rejection to open its ports and airports to traffic by ships and planes from Cyprus as 
the Additional Protocol required resulted in the EU Council’s decision to freeze 
negotiations on 8 chapters in December 2006 (“Free Movement of Goods”; “Right of 
Establishment for Companies & Freedom To Provide Services”; “Financial 
Services”; “Agriculture & Rural Development”; “Fisheries”; “Transport Policy”; 
“Customs Union”; “External Relations”).122 
Bargaining power of France under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy is also 
supposed to effect Turkey’s accession to the EU. An example that one can refer is 
France’s decision of 2007 to prevent opening negotiations on 5 chapters 
(“Agriculture & Rural Development” ; “Economic & Monetary Policy”; “Regional 
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Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments”; “Financial & Budgetary 
Provisions”; “Institutions”) that were considered directly related with membership by 
France.123 
Another EU member state, Cyprus, also applies its bargaining power against 
Turkey’s accession. By using its bargaining power Greek Cyprus vetoed opening 
negotiations on 6 chapters (“Freedom of Movement for Workers”; “Energy”; 
“Judiciary & Fundamental Rights”; “Justice, Freedom & Security”; “Education & 
Culture”; “Foreign, Security & Defence Policy”) in 2009.124 Because of these and 
other facts, one acquis chapter has been discussed and closed (‘Science and 
Research’).  
By using their bargaining power member states causes long delayes in Turkey’s 
accession proccess to the EU. 
The preferences of the EU member states, governments’ preferences in their domestic 
politics and also the demands and preferences of domestic and social groups in the 
member states hold significant importance in both ups and downs in Turkey’s pre-
accession process: the membership of post-soviet states and decision on Turkey’s 
candidacy was the result of political changes of that time. Additionally, the term 
“privileged partnership” instead of full membership was articulated by Angela 
Merkel, the leader of the German Conservative Party (CDU) in 2004 because of both 
domestic politics and the impact of social groups in Germany, which oppose Turkish 
membership. French people with less opposing attitudes towards Turkey’s 
membership in the period of Jacques Chirac’s presidency or more opposing French 
people under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy are other two indicators of this 
approach.125 
Some Turkish researchers argue that the supporters cooperate and negotiate not 
because they help Turkey’s accession, but because they do not want to seem as 
opposing ones and benefit from the mutual relations. Calculations about the present 
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and future payoffs or costs by each supporter can differ. Despite this fact, if the 
general evaluations of the current and future values of the cooperation are higher than 
the value of defection or Turkey’s unilateral exit they cooperate. Accordingly, if the 
latter outweighs the former they will defect. In other words, they cooperate if the 
future less concerns them. Actually, both the objectors and supporters seek for a 
Turkish decision to give up the accession process. The new Turkish foreign policy 
can fail or succeed. Its failure would strengthen the objections and undermine the 
supporters while its success would be indifferent for objectors but worthy for 
supporters. A more developed Turkey is more attractive for supporters to 
cooperate.126 
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V CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
In a large context, further enlargement of the EU and, in a narrow context, Turkey’s 
EU accession is a rather debatable and popular issue. Despite Turkish membership 
efforts since 1950s, it remains the longest and most complicated application process 
of all times. The history of Turkey’s application for the EEC membership dates back 
to 1959, only 1 acquis chapter (Science & Research (June 2006)) out of 35 is 
closed.127 
When it comes to the European public support on Turkey’s accession, the accession 
negotiations and reforms in Turkey go on while the support for Turkish membership 
is not only low, but also in decline. Due to either spontaneous or artificial deficits 
Turkey fails in fully meeting the membership criteria. Enlargement is more than a 
technical procedure of meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Both really-felt concerns and 
rational calculations, and the evaluations of Turkey-, EU-, country-specific factors 
shape Europeans’ attitudes towards Turkey’s EU accession. Because of the two 
previous practice preceding WWI and WWII, the recent economic and financial crisis 
makes arguments about a further large-scale war very actual. It threatens international 
and national security. That is why in Turkey’s accession, there are two new groups of 
concerns. The first new group of concerns is derived from failed and expensive 
enlargement policy of the EU in example of the Ukraine crisis. The second new 
group of concerns emerged from the recent changes in the Middle East brought lots 
of refugees to Europe and made enlargement of the EU less desirable for Europeans. 
In academic circles, it is mostly linked to Turkey’s new foreign policy orientation and 
strategy. Europeans’ traditional concerns rose from the internal instability and 
security problems, democratic deficits in Turkey are now in escalation.   
Turkey’s EU membership sounds unimaginable and highly costly, but rather urgent. 
Recent migration and security issues are often regarded as a challenge to both EU and 
Turkey. Turkey hosts about 2 mln refugees emigrated from Syria because of the war 
in their country. The EU, in its turn, has to cope with the crisis in the Mediterranean. 
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Therefore, they need each other. There exists additional common challenge: ISIS and 
terrorism, threat to security. Now Turkey is ‘the sick man of Europe’ suffering from 
political security and stability while Europe is also ‘sick’, especially in terms of 
economy. Any significant change regarding Turkey’s EU membership process could 
repair political stability and security in Turkey and economic security in Europe. 
Otherwise, the West can lose Turkey in favor of Russia as it did in the 1920s or 
Turkey’s possible expansion to the Arabic world would result in emerging of a new 
polar in the international system. Even if the latter does not come true in a short-term 
perspective, it raises security concerns. The EU also realizes all of these and restarts 
negotiations. Turkey locates in the neighborhood of Middle East that is rich in oil. 
None of the parts conflicting over the Middle East want to lose Turkey in favor of the 
other side. It multiplies threats to security in Turkey. 
Any enlargement, as well as Turkey’s EU membership is the task of elites. None of 
the rounds of enlargement have occurred under the intense public aspirations. 
European citizens unsatisfied with the economic condition they live in and irritated 
by the migrant refugees in their country are doubtful of the further existence of EU 
itself. Under this condition, elites have to take public opinion into consideration in 
decision-making. However, the elites in Europe are able to impact on Islamophobic 
and Turcophobic citizens’ opinion. 
As European elites claim, public opinion is a major determinant in Turkey’s 
accession process and bilateral relations. In addition to analyze the significance and 
level of public support to Turkey, the literature also makes some suggestions in order 
to change the situation and reverse the negative trend of EU public opinion in favor 
of Turkey:128 
- Calls for an entire discussion on the process and mutual benefits of Turkey’s 
accession. It argue that as long as right-wing parties control the debate over 
Turkish accession and use European media as a policy tool, EU citizens will hold 
negative attitude towards Turkey. In order to change the scenery in Turkish favor, 
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EU citizens must be accurately informed about Turkey and a balanced EU-level 
debate over Turkey’s membership must take place. That’s why Ruiz-Jiminez and 
Torreblanca and Hannah Q. Young calls for a wide European-level debate on 
Turkey concentrated on post-national and instrumental arguments rather than 
identitarian or cultural ones.  It is as a way of justification of Turkey’s 
membership. To highlight the identity issues in discussions regarding Turkish 
accession by challenging stereotypes and perceptions is assumed to improve 
Turkey’s image and “brand”.  
- Public diplomacy, extended interaction and cooperation at civil society level 
between EU and Turkish citizens is also considered appropriate to improve 
Turkey’s image in Europe. A positive or negative ‘country brand’ says much 
about the country for Europeans. Direct relations and cooperation between these 
societies can reduce some misinformation or misperception and Turcophobia. 
- Improved integration of Turkish citizens living in EU member-states is often 
presented as a way to reduce differences while a poor, unsuccessful integration of 
Turks and Turkish communities in European countries further worsens Turkey’s 
image. Turks in EU member states are often criticized for being poorly integrated 
to the society of the host country and creating their Turkish community their. This 
fact raises concerns on whether Turks will integrate and give up some of their 
identity or live in a parralel society and threat European identity. 
- Calls for the necessity of conducting new researches on Turkey’s accession while 
the European public are increasingly sceptical about integration and enlargement. 
Some researches find a thorough study of the EU attitudes and perceptions of 
Turkish accession more useful for better understanding of the factors favoring 
support or opposition to Turkey’s EU accession. It can be conducted by civil 
society actors (e.g. university institutes, research centers, think-tanks, etc). 
- Highlighting the possible contributions of A European-level dialogue on the 
future of Europe and the place of Turkey conducted by wider societal levels and 
not just elites, (especially in the civil society level) can more or less impact on 
stereotypes and negative opinion. 
- Argue that political elites have apparent role in shaping European public opinion.  
Political elites can convince the citizens of the advantages/benefits rather than 
disadvantages/costs like influx of immigrants, financial and cultural concerns that 
Turkey can bring to Europe. The politicians can take some measures like limits 
on freedom of movement in order to remove such concerns. 
- Turkish diaspors’ effective activities in European states are also able to draw a 
positive profile of Turkey and Turks and reduce propaganda against themselves. 
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APPENDIX 
 2005  2006  2008  2010  
For  31  28  31  30  
Against  55  59  55  59  
Don’t 
Know  
14  13  14  11 
 Table 1. European public opinion on Turkey’s EU accession129 
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 TABLE A130 
 
Acquis chapter  Screening 
Started 
Screening 
Completed 
Chapter 
Frozen 
Chapter 
Unfrozen 
Chapter 
Opened 
Chapter 
Closed 
1. Free 
Movement of 
Goods 
16 January 
2006 
24 February 
2006 
11 
December 
2006 
– – – 
2. Freedom of 
Movement For 
Workers 
19 July 
2006 
11 
September 
2006 
8 
December 
2009 
– – – 
3. Right of 
Establishment 
For Companies 
& Freedom To 
Provide Services 
21 
November 
2005 
20 
December 
2005 
11 
December 
2006 
– – – 
4. Free 
Movement of 
Capital 
25 
November 
2005 
22 
December 
2005 
– – 19 
December 
2008 
– 
5. Public 
Procurement 
7 
November 
2005 
28 
November 
2005 
– – – – 
6. Company Law 21 June 
2006 
20 July 2006 – – 17 June 
2008 
– 
                                                          
130 ‘Accession of Turkey to the European Union.’ www.wikipedia.org 
7. Intellectual 
Property Law 
6 February 
2006 
3 March 
2006 
– – 17 June 
2008 
– 
8. Competition 
Policy 
8 
November 
2005 
2 December 
2005 
– – – – 
9. Financial 
Services 
29 March 
2006 
3 May 2006 11 
December 
2006 
– – – 
10. Information 
Society & Media 
12 June 
2006 
14 July 2006 – – 19 
December 
2008 
– 
11. Agriculture 
& Rural 
Development 
5 
December 
2005 
26 January 
2006 
11 
December 
2006 
– – – 
12. Food Safety, 
Veterinary & 
Phytosanitary 
Policy 
9 March 
2006 
28 April 
2006 
– – 30 June 
2010 
– 
13. Fisheries 24 
February 
2006 
31 March 
2006 
11 
December 
2006 
– – – 
14. Transport 
Policy 
26 June 
2006 
28 
September 
2006 
11 
December 
2006 
– – – 
15. Energy 15 May 
2006 
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2006 
8 
December 
2009 
– – – 
16. Taxation 6 June 
2006 
12 July 2006 – – 30 June 
2009 
– 
17. Economic & 
Monetary Policy 
16 
February 
2006 
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2006 
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2007 
14 
December 
2015 
14 
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2015 
– 
18. Statistics 19 June 
2006 
18 July 2006 – – 25 June 
2007 
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19. Social Policy 
& Employment 
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2006 
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– –  – 
20. Enterprise & 
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2006 
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21. Trans-
European 
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2006 
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September 
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2007 
– 
22. Regional 
Policy & 
Coordination of 
Structural 
Instruments 
11 
September 
2006 
10 October 
2006 
25 June 
2007 
12 
February 
2013 
5 
November 
2013 
– 
23. Judiciary & 
Fundamental 
7 
September 
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2006 
8 
December 
– – – 
Rights 2006 2009 
24. Justice, 
Freedom & 
Security 
23 January 
2006 
15 February 
2006 
8 
December 
2009 
– – – 
25. Science & 
Research 
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2005 
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– – 12 June 
2006 
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2006 
26. Education & 
Culture 
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2005 
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27. Environment 
and Climate 
Change 
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2006 
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28. Consumer & 
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2006 
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2007 
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29. Customs 
Union 
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2006 
14 March 
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December 
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– – – 
30. External 
Relations 
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2006 
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September 
2006 
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December 
2006 
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31. Foreign, 
Security & 
Defence Policy 
14 
September 
2006 
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– – – 
32. Financial 
Control 
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2006 
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2006 
– – 26 July 
2007 
– 
33. Financial & 
Budgetary 
Provisions 
6 
September 
2006 
4 October 
2006 
25 June 
2007 
– – – 
34. Institutions 
(Nothing to 
adopt) 
– – – – - – 
35. Other Issues 
(Nothing to 
adopt) 
– – – – – – 
Progress 33 out of 
33 
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